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ERASING PRESENCE THROUGH REASONABLE SUSPICION: 




This Article examines the long shadow cast on local policing by Terry v. 
Ohio, tracing the impact of Terry’s progeny on state legislative campaigns 
focused on immigration enforcement. The policing tools afforded by Terry’s 
progeny have an unmistakable presence-deterring effect on communities 
of color—so painfully illustrated in New York City during the siege-like 
“stop-and-frisk” program—and have provided the foundation on which 
states like Texas and Arizona can build statutory schemes to achieve “attri-
tion through enforcement.” This Article unpacks how the broad police 
power afforded by Terry and its progeny meets legislative provisions au-
thorizing or mandating immigration inquiry at the lowest level encounter 
with law enforcement. At this confluence, states can use Terry as a sword 
to create an environment so hostile to undocumented immigrants that they 
are under siege in their own communities and, ultimately, forced to leave. 
This Article further discusses how to arm advocacy groups to fight the 
harms of Terry and its progeny by seeking greater transparency and ac-
countability through data collection on police encounters, while fighting 
the harms of the state legislative campaigns by engaging immigrant em-
ployers in the fight to recognize and maintain the dignity of immigrants in 
the United States. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................... 409 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 410 
II. TERRY’S LONG SHADOW ON RACE-BASED ENFORCEMENT ......................... 417 
A. Terry’s Progeny: Immunizing Race-Based Policing Against Fourth 
Amendment Challenges .................................................................... 421 
B. The Well-Documented Harms of Terry to Minority Populations ........ 427 
III. STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES AFTER ARIZONA V. 
UNITED STATES: “STOP, FRISK, AND SHOW ME YOUR PAPERS” ............. 433 
A. The Impact of Formal Partnerships Between Immigration 
Agencies and Local Law Enforcement ............................................... 434 
B. Arizona v. United States: The Rules of the Road for State 
Legislation on Immigration Enforcement ......................................... 437 
C. State Legislation Proliferates and Arizona’s Impact Solidifies ............ 443 
                                                                
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Idaho College of Law, 2019. I am immensely grateful to Profes-
sor Katherine Evans for her guidance on all aspects of this paper and for its inception; to Professor Katherine 
MacFarlane for her invaluable assistance; to the editors of The Idaho Law Review for their eagle eyes and 
insight; and lastly to my parents, Robert and Christine, for the fire in my heart to see a more just world. 
410 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
IV. THE CONFLUENCE OF TERRY’S PROGENY AND STATE LEGISLATION: 
ERASING IMMIGRANT PRESENCE ........................................................... 447 
A. The Legal Confluence of Terry and Anti-Sanctuary Bills: Criminal 
Terry Stops as a Vehicle for Immigration Enforcement .................... 448 
B. Using Terry as a Sword to Erase Immigrant Populations .................... 449 
V. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO CONFRONTING RACIALIZED ENFORCEMENT .... 455 
A. Obstacles to Litigations Challenging Race-Based Policing .................. 455 
B. The Role and Struggle of Data Collection: Keeping Authorities 
Accountable ...................................................................................... 460 
C. Engaging Immigrant Employers in Policy Change ............................... 463 
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 465 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 If you’re in this country illegally and you committed a crime by being 
in this country, you should be uncomfortable, you should look over your 
shoulder. You need to be worried.1 
Thomas Homan, Acting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Direc-
tor, during a House Appropriations Committee Hearing in June 2017. 
The solution is to create “virtual choke points” . . . . [like] firewalls in com-
puter systems, that people could pass through only if their legal status is 
verified. The objective is not mainly to identify illegal aliens for arrest 
(though that will always be a possibility) but rather to make it as difficult 
as possible for illegal aliens to live a normal life here.2 
Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies. 
 The commissioner of the New York City police department views the 
controversial practice of stop, question and frisk as a means to instill fear 
in young African American and Latino men, a New York state senator, [Eric 
Adams,] testified in a federal court on Monday . . . .  
 “[Commissioner Kelly] stated that he targeted and focused on that 
group because he wanted to instill fear in them that every time that they 
left their homes they could be targeted by police,” Adams testified.3 
                                                                
 
 1. Stephen Dinan, No Apologies: ICE Chief Says Illegal Immigrants Should Live in Fear of Depor-
tation, WASH. TIMES (June 13, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/13/thomas-
homan-ice-chief-says-illegal-immigrants-sho/. 
 2. Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition through Enforcement, 
CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 5 (May 2005), https://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2005/back605.pdf. 
 3. Ryan Devereaux, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly ‘Wanted to Instill Fear’ in Black and Latino 
Men, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/01/nypd-ray-kelly-instil-
fear. 
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On May 14, 2017, artist Ricardo Levins Morales was riding on Minneapolis 
Metro Transit when a transit officer began to move about the cabin checking pas-
senger fares and asking for identification.4 An individual did not give him a sufficient 
answer, and the officer asked this person, “Are you here illegally?”5 
It was then that Morales asked the officer if he had been authorized to act on 
the behalf of immigration enforcement.6 The officer replied, “No, not necessarily.”7 
In response, Morales said, “Then I would stay out of that[.] . . . It’s very touchy legal 
territory.”8 The officer responded by arresting the subject, Ariel Vences-Lopez.9 
After the incident was reported to Metro Transit, the Metro Transit Police 
Chief issued a statement emphasizing that it was Metro Transit’s policy not to in-
quire about immigration status.10 This mirrored the Minneapolis and St. Paul Police 
Department’s policies, which prevented officers from asking about people’s immi-
gration status by city ordinance.11 But the damage was done: Mr. Vences-Lopez was 
booked into the county jail, transferred into ICE’s custody, and scheduled for de-
portation to Mexico.12 Though he was later released on bond by an immigration 
judge,13 Mr. Vences-Lopez’s future in the United States had been jeopardized by a 
single, non-consensual interaction with local law enforcement, a very real example 
for the undocumented immigrant community demonstrating that any encounter 
with the police could mean losing a life in the United States. 
On the fiftieth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio, it is fitting to examine the control-
ling power of non-consensual stops made with less than probable cause on undoc-
umented immigrant communities. Terry has been a source of scholarly critique 
about racial profiling: in New York, Terry stops were used to target the “right peo-
ple” and had the impact of instilling fear in young men of color, leading them to 
                                                                
 4. Associated Press, Video Shows Transit Officer Asking about Immigration Status, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (May 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-05-20/video-shows-transit-
officer-asking-about-immigration-status. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Will Ashenmacher, Metro Transit: We Didn’t Note Immigration Status for Ariel Vences-Lopez, 
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (May 27, 2017), https://www.twincities.com/2017/05/27/metro-transit-we-didnt-
note-immigration-status-for-ariel-vences-lopez/. 
 10. Amber Ferguson, ‘Are You Here Illegally?’: Probe Underway into Video of Transit Officer 
Checking Rider’s Immigration Status, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/05/22/are-you-here-illegally-minneapolis-probes-video-of-
transit-officer-checking-riders-immigration-status/?utm_term=.8fa2711c487e. 
 11. Ibrahim Hirsi, For Undocumented Immigrants, the ‘Sanctuary City’ of Minneapolis Doesn’t 
Feel Much Like a Sanctuary, MINN. POST (June 5, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-pol-
icy/2017/06/undocumented-immigrants-sanctuary-city-minneapolis-doesnt-feel-much-sanctuar. In gen-
eral, these ordinances, inter alia, have led to the Minneapolis-St. Paul area being labeled a “sanctuary city,” 
even though the Minneapolis Mayor says she does not use the term: “I don’t want to overpromise what the 
city can do.” Id. 
 12. Ashenmacher, supra note 9. 
 13. Mila Koumpilova, Immigration Judge Releases Man Detained After Light-Rail Confrontation, 
STAR TRIB. (July 13, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/immigration-judge-releases-man-detained-after-
light-rail-confrontation/434313693/. 
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believe that they could be stopped at any time for no reason.14 In the immigration 
enforcement context, Terry’s deterrent effect allows state policymakers to endorse 
the efforts of local enforcement officers to enforce immigration without entering 
formalized agreements with ICE or violating principles of federalism by taking on 
powers exclusively held by federal immigration authorities. By applying the tools of 
policing, states can realize the twin political goals of eliminating sanctuary jurisdic-
tions and encouraging the self-deportation of undocumented immigrants. They do 
so by moving the spotlight from federal attempts to coerce local agencies to the 
state arena, where legislative campaigns co-opt local officers to do the “heavy lift-
ing” of self-deportation. 
In the wake of President Donald Trump’s election, legislation concerning im-
migration began to proliferate in state legislatures, the number of bills enacted in-
creasing by 110% in 2017 from the prior year.15 Many of these bills addressed “sanc-
tuary policies”—local or state policies that limit or prohibit agency cooperation with 
immigration authorities—by waging the same war of attrition through funding that 
President Donald Trump has promised to wage.16 In response to the Administra-
tion’s position on immigration, other states like California reacted oppositely, ex-
pressing statewide support for sanctuary policies.17 The federal government has 
met state legislation reflecting federal immigration enforcement priorities with 
                                                                
 14. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 602–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also Devereaux, 
supra note 3. 
 15. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2018). Only one state nationwide did not enact any immigration-related legislation in 2017. 
2017 Immigration Report, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2017-immigra-
tion-report.aspx (last updated Feb. 12, 2018). Notably, legislative campaign trends concerning immigration 
have come in reaction to political trends—2012 and 2013’s increase may have come as a result of DACA’s 
implementation, while 2010’s increase may have been in response to Arizona S.B. 1070, the first omnibus 
bill of its kind directed at immigration enforcement. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, 
supra. 
 16. At the federal level, early in his first year, President Trump issued an embattled and ulti-
mately enjoined executive order promising to deny federal funding to such sanctuary jurisdictions. Eli Ros-
enberg, Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Denying Funding to Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/21/federal-judge-blocks-
trumps-executive-order-on-denying-funding-to-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.873ad50f3636. Analogously, 
legislation introduced in Idaho and enacted in Texas threatened local agencies’ funding if they adopt, en-
force, or endorse sanctuary policies. Betsy Z. Russell, Proposed Law in Idaho Would Discourage Sanctuary 
Cities and Direct Law Enforcement to Question People’s Immigration Status, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/jan/30/idaho-house-panel-introduces-immigration-bill-targ/; 
Manny Fernandez, Federal Judge Blocks Texas’ Ban on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/judge-texas-sanctuary-cities.html. Notably and most recently, 
the federal government has even explored avenues to levy criminal charges against leaders of sanctuary 
cities. Stephen Dinan, Homeland Security Pursues Charges Against Leaders of Sanctuary Cities, WASH. TIMES 
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/16/dhs-asks-prosecutors-charge-sanc-
tuary-city-leaders/. 
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praise,18 especially in light of constitutional issues implicated when the federal gov-
ernment strong-arms states into enforcing federal law.19 
Multiple cases in lower courts are examining the role and scope of local offic-
ers in immigration enforcement.20 Some of these cases implicate issues of federal-
ism, asking whether and how the federal government can coerce local law enforce-
ment agencies to enforce immigration both pre- and post-arrest.21 Yet other cases 
concern state legislation about post-arrest immigration enforcement—compliance  
with detainers, for example, after an arrest for both minor and severe criminal vio-
lations.22 These direct pathways for local enforcement to feed undocumented im-
                                                                
 18. Julián Aguilar, In Austin, Sessions Touts Trump’s Hardline Stance on Immigration, TEX. TRIB. 
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/20/austin-sessions-touts-trumps-hardline-stance-
immigration/. This has also extended beyond applause—U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions pledged De-
partment of Justice support to Texas in the litigation that followed Texas S.B. 4’s passage. Philip Jankowski, 
Trump Administration to Defend ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Ban in Texas Lawsuit, MY STATESMAN (June 23, 2017), 
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state--regional/trump-administration-defend-sanctuary-cities-ban-
texas-lawsuit/8r1fSKZtygM1bue8jkjmdI/. 
 19. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). There, at issue were provisions of 
the Brady Act that amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by requiring state enforcement officers to help 
enforce a federal gun control scheme—officers were directly conscripted to perform background checks on 
handgun transferees. Id. at 935. The Court found that this direct conscription violated states’ autonomy 
preserved in the constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Id. at 918–19. Furthermore, requiring state en-
forcement officers to enforce federal law violated separation of powers, as it was the role of the Executive 
branch, not state enforcement officers, to enforce federal law. Id. at 922. In the immigration context, the 
federal government would violate these principles of federalism if it required states to enforce federal im-
migration law, but would not violate these principles if states acted independently and engaged in what one 
scholar has called “immigration federalism[:]” . . . “the engagement by national, state, and local governmen-
tal actors in immigration regulation.” See Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 703, 709–10 (2013). Of course, as will be discussed infra in Section II.B, state action must also clear the 
Constitutional hurdles of federal preemption. See infra Section II.B. 
 20. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017), rev’d in part, 885 F.3d 
332 (5th Cir. 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 
933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-5720); City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 21. President Trump’s Executive Order 13768, as implemented by the Attorney General’s ac-
companying Memorandum, set as a precondition for federal funding certification of the jurisdiction’s com-
pliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012). Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Memoran-
dum from the Attorney Gen. for all Dep’t Grant-Making Components (May 22, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/press-release/file/968146/download. Though jurisdictions like the City of Chicago gained cer-
tification of compliance, the Department of Justice released press releases indicating it believed some juris-
dictions had wrongfully earned certification, also levying further conditions on receipt of funds. Complaint 
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 20. These jurisdictions filed a complaint asking for a declar-
atory judgment that the conditions placed on federal funding were unlawful, as well as for an injunction 
against the enforcement of the conditions. Id. This case, and cases like it, ask whether the federal govern-
ment can leverage funding to force local jurisdictions to enforce immigration. Id. 
 22. Texas Senate Bill 4, enacted in 2017 and discussed infra in Section II.C, required local juris-
dictions to comply with all detainer requests. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.251 (West 2017). A complaint 
filed by the City of El Cenizo challenged major provisions of Senate Bill 4, and in particular raised the question 
of whether states could force local jurisdictions to comply with all detainer requests despite concerns about 
financial and constitutional costs. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City of 
El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 5:17-cv-404-OLG). 
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migrants into the deportation pipeline through criminal convictions are not the fo-
cus of this Article.23 Extensive scholarship exists on the subject and addresses the 
Fourth Amendment violations inflicted upon individuals subject to detainer.24 
Another set of cases, however, concerns state legislation about pre-arrest im-
migration enforcement. Inter alia, provisions in Arizona’s 2010 omnibus bill, S.B. 
1070, authorized warrantless stops based on probable cause of a subject’s unlawful 
presence,25 and mandated that officers determine the immigration status of indi-
viduals during police encounters.26 After the subsequent litigation that culminated 
in the Supreme Court case Arizona v. United States,27 states had defined space in 
the immigration enforcement field to occupy by mandating that officers determine 
the immigration status of people who are lawfully stopped.28 This is the less-exam-
ined but more pervasive, indirect means of achieving the erasure of undocumented 
immigrants; officers use tools that have been validated by the Court to instill fear, 
discourage presence, and encourage self-deportation. 
Self-deportation refers to immigration enforcement that makes life so miser-
able for undocumented immigrants that they leave.29 This was the explicit goal of 
Arizona S.B. 1070—to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of 
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present . . . .”30 This approach 
acknowledges that formal deportation of all undocumented immigrants is unrealis-
tic both practically and politically.31 By making jobs more difficult to obtain or re-
quiring status verification at the “virtual chokepoints” referenced by Center for Im-
migration Studies Director Mark Krikorian,32 life becomes so difficult and filled with 
fear that undocumented immigrants arrange their own departures, thus lessening 
the load on ICE. Though the “self-deportation” approach is predominantly federal 
in focus, states like Arizona, Texas, and even Idaho have entered the fray with bills 
like S.B. 1070, designed to deputize local officers to enforce immigration.33 
                                                                
 23. For a discussion of the “jail-to-deportation pipeline” by triggering deportation through run-
ins with local law enforcement that result in a criminal conviction, see Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants Are 
Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691 (2016). In 
contrast, this Article focuses on interactions with law enforcement that may not even result in a criminal 
charge. 
 24. See generally Alia Al-Khatib, Putting a Hold on ICE: Why Law Enforcement Should Refuse to 
Honor Immigration Detainers, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 109 (2014); Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration 
Detainer Enforcement under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281 (2013). 
 25. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 2(b), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-
1051(B) (2010). 
 26. Id.  
 27. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. Adam Serwer, “Self-Deportation”: It’s a Real Thing, and It Isn’t Pretty, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 24, 
2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/01/romneys-self-deportation-just-another-term-ala-
bama-style-immigration-enforcement/#. 
 30. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 1. 
 31. Wayne A. Cornelius, Why Immigrants Won’t Self-Deport, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-cornelius-self-deportation-20161130-story.html. 
 32. Krikorian, supra note 2, at 5. 
 33. Arizona’s Immigration Law Is Back in Court, “Self-Deportation” on the Rise, PUB. RADIO INT’L: 
TAKEAWAY (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-04-26/arizonas-immigration-law-back-court-
self-deportation-rise; Russell, supra note 16. 
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ICE’s limited workforce and federal inaction with that workforce has been the 
root of many states’ hyper-focus on local law enforcement agencies.34 ICE employs 
approximately 12,000 officers to enforce immigration laws on estimates of up to 
12.5 million undocumented immigrants.35 Policymakers already know that direct 
partnerships between local agencies and ICE provide the “highly successful force 
multiplier” to deport, as lauded by Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
John Kelly.36 More insidiously, however, states co-opt local officers into immigration 
enforcement—requiring them to ask about immigration status through provisions 
commonly known by opponents as “Show Me Your Papers” bills.37 Even more telling 
is that state legislatures passing provisions that keep local agencies from prohibiting 
their officers from asking about immigration status—referred to in this Article as 
“Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions38—are counting on local officers to carry 
out anti-immigrant agendas with self-deportation at its core. 
Not surprisingly, lobbyists and state legislators understand that encounters—
actual or feared—with local law enforcement is the most critical stage for immigra-
tion enforcement because of the prevalence of encounters with state and local of-
ficers.39 But the significance of these encounters extends beyond the direct path-
ways from criminal convictions to deportation. The indirect pathway of fear to self-
                                                                
 34. See Kevin J. Fandl, Putting States Out of the Immigration Law Enforcement Business, 9 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 529, 540 (2015); Kristen McCabe & Doris Meissner, Immigration and the United States: Re-
cession Affects Flows, Prospects for Reform, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.migration-
policy.org/article/immigration-and-united-states-recession-affects-flows-prospects-reform; Arizona is Not 
the First State to Take Immigration Matters into Their Own Hands, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 26, 2010), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/arizona-not-first-state-take-immigration-matters-
their-own-hands. 
 35. According to ICE’s 2016 fiscal year budget, there are only about 12,000 agents—Enforcement 
& Removal Operations (ERO) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) combined—which has been 
blamed for ICE being backlogged. Josh Keefe, How Many Immigration Border Officers Are There? Trump to 
Increase ICE Enforcement Agents by 80%, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-
many-immigration-border-officers-are-there-trump-increase-ice-enforcement-agents-2495482. For cur-
rent undocumented immigrant estimates, see Alan Gomez, Undocumented Immigrant Population in U.S. 
Stays Flat for Eighth Straight Year, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/world/2017/04/25/undocumented-immigrant-population-united-
states/100877164/; Spencer Raley, How Many Illegal Aliens Are in the US?, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM 
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/how-many-illegal-immigrants-are-in-us. 
 36. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan et al., 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. 3 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Inter-
est.pdf). 
 37. See Audrey McGlinchy, How Does Texas’ ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Bill Stack up against Arizona’s 
‘Show Me Your Papers’ Law?, AUSTIN MONITOR (May 5, 2017), https://www.austinmonitor.com/sto-
ries/2017/05/texas-sanctuary-cities-bill-stack-arizonas-show-papers-law/. The moniker “Show Me Your Pa-
pers” has been used to refer to provisions mandating or authorizing officers to determine a subject’s immi-
gration status, but as will be discussed infra, I suggest a notable distinction between “Show Me Your Papers” 
and the recent wave of “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” provisions. See infra Section III.C. 
 38. See infra Section III.C. 
 39. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local 
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 234–35 (2006). Kris Kobach, notably, went on to 
assist in the drafting of S.B. 1070 with Russell Pearce. Russell Pearce, SB 1070 Is Working, HILL (Apr. 19, 
2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/222597-sb1070-is-working. 
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deportation is equally vital to achieve states’ immigration enforcement agendas. 
When immigrants fear that their local law enforcement is enforcing immigration 
law—not just serving and protecting the community—they are less likely to report 
crimes or cooperate with local police.40 They are less likely to travel throughout 
their communities for fear of being stopped.41 By co-opting local enforcement into 
a broader force of immigration enforcement—and imbuing local enforcement with 
the miasma of fear otherwise surrounding federal immigration enforcement (“la 
migra”)42—state legislators can target sanctuary jurisdictions by systematically 
making them feel unwelcome, thereby encouraging self-deportation. To do so, 
state legislators must rely upon the full range of tools available to local law enforce-
ment and count on local officers to carry out immigration enforcement alongside 
their normal policing duties.43 Terry v. Ohio and its progeny are core to this strategy, 
allowing for implementation by pervasive population control.44 State legislators 
passing “Show Me Your Papers” or “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” provisions com-
plement this control by mandating or authorizing immigration status determination 
during stops that largely sit outside judicial review.45 
Part I discusses Terry v. Ohio’s impact on race-based immigration enforce-
ment. I first explore Terry’s significance for local criminal enforcement, as well as 
the subsequent cases establishing the acceptable factors for reasonable suspicion. 
Given Terry’s application and abuse in New York City, I discuss the danger of deep 
injury in communities of color when stops on less than probable cause are consti-
tutionally immunized. Part II examines the variable success of state initiatives to 
enforce immigration law, setting forth the confines of federalism on enlisting local 
enforcement as indicated in Arizona v. Johnson, discussing the avenues of direct 
local partnership between counties and ICE, and fleshing out the space created by 
the Court in Arizona v. Johnson. I argue that the new wave of state-led legislative 
campaigns seeks to take up as much of this Court-created space as possible, regu-
                                                                
 40. Mai Thi Nguyen & Hannah Gill, Interior Immigration Enforcement: The Impacts of Expanding 
Local Law Enforcement Authority, 53 URB. STUD. 302, 316 (2016). 
 41. Id. at 316–17; Andy Uhler, In the Texas Countryside, Undocumented Immigrants Live with a 
Different Kind of Fear, MARKETPLACE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/02/01/life/texas-
countryside-undocumented-immigrants-live-different-kind-fear. 
 42. Nguyen & Gill, supra note 40, at 316. 
 43. As will be discussed infra in Section II.A, these tools are amplified in § 287(g) jurisdictions 
with the delegation of federal immigration authority; for an in-depth examination of the intersection of local 
policing and immigration enforcement in the § 287(g) jurisdiction Nashville, Tennessee, see AMADA ARMENTA, 
PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE OF POLICING AS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3–4 (2017). 
 44. See infra Section II.B (discussing the pervasive population control experienced by minority 
neighborhoods in New York City). 
 45. Notably, the cases establishing the boundaries of police search and seizure overwhelmingly 
tend to be appeals from suppression motions where evidence was acquired during a search or seizure; 
searches or seizures that do not lead to arrests or evidence may of course be challenged through § 1983 
actions (discussed infra in Section IV.A), but are not automatically subject to judicial review through proba-
ble cause hearings (for arrests) or suppression hearings (for evidence). See also infra Section III.A. This be-
comes particularly relevant when the only “evidence” at issue is a subject’s identity; for the undocumented 
immigrant, the fact that identity evidence cannot be suppressed can mean any encounter with police can 
lead to severe immigration consequences with no recourse even if the encounter was entirely suspicionless. 
See, e.g., Immigr. & Nationalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056 (2016). 
2018 ERASING PRESENCE THROUGH REASONABLE SUSPICION: TERRY AND ITS 
PROGENY AS A VEHICLE FOR STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
417 
 
lating within the confines of Arizona and in doing so, mandating—or at least author-
izing—enforcement at the local level through the actions of individual police offic-
ers. 
In Part III, this Article discusses the confluence of Terry and these state legis-
lative campaigns, arguing that the sheer power of a “reasonable suspicion” stand-
ard at the local law enforcement level when used to amplify the political goal of 
deportation—or self-deportation—harms immigrant communities by using its “de-
terrent” effect to erase immigrant presence. Part IV examines the challenges to a 
litigation response of confronting racial profiling, especially in the immigration 
realm. The Article argues that major structural obstacles to equal protection chal-
lenges make advocating for data collection a necessity for advocacy groups, but that 
the most effective short-term solution is engaging industries that employ immi-
grants. Then, the Article ultimately concludes that advocacy groups must be fully 
aware of the way states use the lowest level of policing encounters as broadened 
by Terry to create environments so hostile to immigrants that they leave. Armed 
with this knowledge, advocacy groups must push for data collection and industry 
engagement together, lest reliance on immigrant employers discount the human 
dignity of immigrant populations. 
II. TERRY’S LONG SHADOW ON RACE-BASED ENFORCEMENT 
Encounters with state and local law enforcement are governed by the Fourth 
Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.46 The 
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant supported by probable cause for a search or 
a seizure to be valid.47 The reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined by 
balancing the government’s protection of public interests and the individual’s right 
to be free from invasions of privacy.48 The Court establishes through precedent 
what will be considered reasonable, and, by this blueprint, agencies establish poli-
cies governing encounters with the civilian population and protecting rights for cit-
izens.49 A significant way to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment was the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule—suppression of evidence acquired during an un-
lawful search or seizure.50 
Probable cause, required by the Fourth Amendment, has been the touchstone 
of valid searches and seizures and is defined as “a fair probability” that the person 
                                                                
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was incorporated to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 48. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–
37 (1967)). 
 49. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. 
REV. 929 (1965); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality 
Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2011) (arguing that criminal procedure developed in Supreme 
Court cases between the 1920s and 1960s were concerned with “the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of 
equal citizenship”). 
 50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961). 
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being arrested committed the crime charged, or that the thing being searched con-
tains the evidence police are looking for.51 Though, as time went on and exceptions 
were added—exigencies, for example, would excuse an officer from having to get a 
warrant before entering a home52—probable cause remained the required stand-
ard to determine that the exception was valid. 
Before Terry v. Ohio, there were two kinds of police encounters with the public 
that were recognized by the Court. If voluntary, an officer did not need to justify 
the interaction with probable cause, but if she had probable cause to arrest for 
criminal behavior, she could.53 In the decades before Terry, probable cause was easy 
to establish because of anti-loitering or vagrancy laws, which were prevalent until 
the late 1960s and rendered otherwise innocent behavior criminal.54 But as these 
laws fell into disuse, there was a new need for the courts to examine encounters in 
light of Fourth Amendment concerns and for police to justify these encounters.55 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court was presented for the first time with the question 
of whether the Fourth Amendment protected citizens from “sidewalk searches and 
seizures . . . where the purpose of the detention was an investigatory stop, rather 
than an arrest.”56 Faced with the prospect of suppressing evidence found when an 
officer searched three individuals he suspected were about to commit armed rob-
bery,57 the Court took the opportunity to constitutionalize two policing tools uti-
lized by the officer—the stop and the frisk—and set forth different standards for 
each.58 
As relayed by Justice Warren in the Court’s opinion in Terry, the facts were 
these: an experienced beat cop-turned-detective, Officer Martin McFadden, was 
patrolling in downtown Cleveland when he encountered two men standing on a 
street corner: John Terry and Richard Chilton.59 Officer McFadden testified that he 
had been a detective for a long time and that he knew that the individuals in ques-
tion “didn’t look right to [him] at the time.”60 His interest piqued, Officer McFadden 
began to observe the two from about 400 feet away, and what he saw “[gave him] 
                                                                
 51. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 52. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). 
 53. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976). 
 54. William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 1215–16 (1998) (explaining 
that around this time loitering and vagrancy laws were falling to challenges of vagueness). 
 55. Id. See also William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559–60 (1992) (“[T]he scope of police authority to make brief street stops became 
a hard issue only in the mid- to late 1960s, when loitering and vagrancy laws were struck down on vagueness 
grounds (so that the police needed to find some other justification for street stops). Only after the courts 
constrained the power to define crimes did Fourth Amendment standards come to mean something on city 
streets.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 56. Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No 
Place for a Reasonable Person, 36 HOWARD L.J. 239, 242 (1993). Notably, one issue first confronted in Terry—
the constitutionality of stopping and questioning pedestrians without probable cause—had been lamented 
as being ignored by courts; in rapid-fire succession the Court addressed this issue not in one but three cases 
total in the same session. Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, 
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 40–42 (1968). 
 57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1968). 
 58. Id. at 27. 
 59. Id. at 5. 
 60. Id.  
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more purpose to watch them . . . .”61 He watched one leave the other and go to a 
store window, then walk on, then return, looking back into the same store window 
before rejoining his companion; at some point they met up with a third man, a man 
later identified as Katz.62 Based on these observations, Officer McFadden believed 
that Terry and Chilton were casing stores for an armed stickup.63 He stopped the 
three men, asked their names, and upon receiving mumbling responses he patted 
down all three; finding guns on Terry and Chilton, he arrested all three men.64 The 
two charged with carrying concealed weapons sought to suppress the guns that 
were found; their motions were denied, they were convicted, and they appealed.65 
There were two components to the issue before the Court in Terry: the stop 
and the frisk. Because the case was before the Court due to the denied suppression 
motion, Justice Warren, in speaking for the Court, drew a narrow boundary around 
the question to be answered.66 To answer this narrow question, however, the Court 
had to decide whether the seizure (the initial stop) and the search (the subsequent 
frisk yielding the evidence in dispute) were valid under the Fourth Amendment.67 
The Court ultimately answered both in the affirmative.68 
In its reasoning, the Court dispensed with the State’s arguments that the stop 
was not a seizure and that the frisks were not searches, even acknowledging that 
being frisked was not a “petty indignity.”69 On the other hand, the Court also re-
jected the petitioners’ argument that any non-consensual encounter with police re-
quired probable cause.70 Instead, the Court constitutionalized an intermediate 
standard for a non-consensual stop, placing a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of 
the interests of crime prevention and officer safety.71 The intermediate standards 
being crafted here—i.e., “reasonable suspicion” instead of probable cause for an 
underlying nonconsensual stop, or reason to believe the subject was “armed and 
presently dangerous” for a frisk72—called for deference to officers who needed to 
                                                                
 61. Id. at 5–6. 
 62. Id. at 6–7. 
 63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
 64. Id. at 6–7. 
 65. Id. at 7–8. 
 66. Id. at 12 (“[T]he issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility 
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure.”). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 920 (1998). 
 67. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15–16. 
 68. The case itself supports an inference that the seizure was valid, as the frisk would not have 
been valid without the investigatory stop being valid. Id. at 30. However, this has been criticized by scholars; 
Professor Saltzburg notes in an otherwise approving piece, that the Court skipped over the stop straight to 
the frisk, “virtually ignor[ing]” whether the stop was a stop at all. Saltzburg, supra note 66, at 922. The failure 
to provide substantial analysis for the stop itself is discussed infra as a significant criticism, for in order “[f]or 
Terry to provide meaningful guidance, the Court needed to expand on this ‘trigger issue[.]’” Lewis R. Katz, 
Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 444 (2004). 
 69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17 (“emphatically reject[ing the] notion” that the “stop and frisk” Of-
ficer McFadden subjected Terry, Chilton, and Katz to did not rise to the level of a “‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within 
the meaning of the Constitution”). 
 70. Id. at 11. 
 71. Id. at 28. See also Katz, supra note 68, at 424. 
 72. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
 
420 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
take “swift action predicated upon [their] on-the-spot observations. . . .”73 In this 
specific case, given the facts available to Officer McFadden—and by proxy, the 
Court—the individual’s interest in his freedom to leave as well as his personal secu-
rity was not as weighty as the interest in preventing crimes and protecting investi-
gating officers. Thus, a two-fold holding emerged in Terry: (1) if an officer had rea-
sonable suspicion based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts,” warranted the intrusion of a temporary 
stop, he could conduct a non-consensual stop to investigate; and (2) if the officer 
had reason to believe that the person he had stopped was armed and presently 
dangerous, he could conduct “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” to 
find weapons that could be used against him.74 In so doing, the Court fashioned a 
“compromise” standard that brought the practice of stop and frisk “within the 
Fourth Amendment.”75 
Even while giving this “needed tool” to police,76 the Court acknowledged the 
already-palpable tension between the police community and minority groups.77 
However, the Court offered a tepid shrug about the power of the exclusionary rule 
to prevent the “wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police commu-
nity, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain[.]”78 This 
viewpoint of powerlessness is reflected in how the facts recited by the Court point-
edly did not include mention of the petitioners’ race—they were both black, a fact 
that has not escaped notice and criticism by scholars.79 This perceived futility of the 
exclusionary rule to prevent this harassment seems like a shrug aimed at those who 
point at Terry’s consequences today: the harassment would have happened any-
way, even if the exclusionary rule was applied to suppress evidence discovered as a 
result.80 
This Part discusses Terry’s impact in the cases that further fleshed out the facts 
that would suffice as the basis for reasonable suspicion. It discusses how these 
                                                                
 73. Id. at 20. 
 74. Id. at 21, 29. 
 75. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgements: Supreme Court Rheto-
ric versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 984 (1998); Susan Bandes, Terry 
v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 491, 492–93 (1999). 
 76. Katz, supra note 68, at 429. 
 77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15. 
 78. Id. at 14. See also Katz, supra note 68, at 443 (“The Court seemed resigned to its powerless-
ness: that no matter how it ruled in Terry, it would have little impact on the streets because no matter the 
rule, police would not obey it.”). 
 79. I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 64 (2009).  
 80. Katz, supra note 68, at 442. 
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cases—referred to in this Article as Terry’s progeny81—established race or race-cor-
relative facts as acceptable reasons to make police stops.82 This Part also discusses 
how the gaps in Terry have been filled in by the Court’s hand-wave of pretextual 
stops in Whren v. United States. This Part then explores leading criticisms of Terry’s 
“reasonable suspicion” standard and examines the shockwaves of harm to minority 
communities that race-based policing has inflicted. 
It should be noted, I am not arguing that Terry v. Ohio, with the advent of the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard, created racial profiling. The Court in Terry 
acknowledged the risk of over-policing in the minority community and that this risk 
was already a reality for some jurisdictions.83 Neither am I conflating Terry with its 
progeny. However, I argue that the lowering of the standard for a non-consensual 
encounter with law enforcement helped to legitimize racialized local policing.84 
Consequently, Terry’s significant implications amplify immigration enforcement 
when co-opted by state legislation.85 
A. Terry’s Progeny: Immunizing Race-Based Policing Against Fourth Amendment 
Challenges 
After Terry, the die was cast. Police officers now had Court-sanctioned discre-
tion to utilize the new intermediate standard. In the years following Terry, the term 
“reasonable suspicion” was widely relied upon, but it was left to applying courts to 
decide what specific facts would pass muster.86 As time passed and the lower courts 
continued to apply the reasoning in Terry to define permissible grounds for stops,87 
                                                                
 81. In scholarship, the phrase “Terry’s progeny” has differing meanings depending on the au-
thor’s focus; for example, Professor Capers has included Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) and 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) as Terry’s progeny. Capers, supra note 79, at 74. Professor 
Harris has generally referred to Terry’s progeny as cases expanding, demarcating, or clarifying factors of 
reasonable suspicion, including such cases as Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47 (1979), United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) 
(inter alia). See generally David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 661–67, 677 (1994). I recognize that this treatment of “Terry’s progeny” 
can implicate “thousands of cases,” as the Fifth Circuit notes. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 447 
(5th Cir. 2010). Therefore, in this Article, I draw attention to Supreme Court cases following Terry v. Ohio 
that do or may implicate race or ethnic appearance, in particular United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873 (1975), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), Brown v. Texas, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119 (2000), and Whren v. United States. 
 82. See infra Section I.A, in particular notes 89–118 and accompanying text. 
 83. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968). 
 84. See Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern 
District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199, 215 
(2014). 
 85. See infra Part III (discussing the confluence of Terry’s legacy and state efforts to co-opt polic-
ing tools to deter the presence of undocumented immigrants). 
 86. Harris, supra note 75, at 985–87. Here, Professor Harris observes that the Supreme Court 
stuck generally to the script provided by Terry, but that lower courts pushed the envelope in applying Terry: 
“Regardless of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical reassurances, the law as applied by lower courts has moved 
away from the Court’s insistence on individualized suspicion.” Id. at 987 (emphasis added). 
 87. Harris, supra note 75, at 988 (“[T]he reasons courts accept as legitimate bases for stops make 
a great deal of difference.”). 
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the consequence of Terry for local criminal enforcement became clear: officers sus-
pecting criminal activity could stop individuals based in part on race when relevant 
to particularized suspicion, as well as the race-correlative socioeconomic factors of 
location and evasion.88 
Of course, race may be relied upon by officers who are working with a descrip-
tion of a known suspect.89 The water is muddied, however, when police use race as 
“a factor in deciding which person in a group of strangers is more likely than others 
to be involved in some as-yet-unknown crime.”90 Though “racial profiling” is a term 
that engenders significant controversy,91 the Court itself has hand-waved in race or 
race-correlative factors as potentially relevant for the reasonable suspicion stand-
ard through a series of cases flowing from Terry v. Ohio, each requiring “less and 
less evidence for a stop and frisk.”92 
In the years following Terry, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not 
prohibit deciding whether or who to stop, question, and frisk based at least in part 
on race; this was established through a pair of cases in 1975 and 1976. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce was the first to do so, holding that Border Patrol could not base a 
stop for reasonable suspicion of alienage solely on an individual’s appearance.93 
There, Border Patrol officers stopped an automobile for the sole reason that its 
three occupants were of Mexican appearance, believing them to be present in the 
country unlawfully.94 This, the Court decided, was insufficient to constitute reason-
able suspicion.95 However, the Court emphasized the government’s interest in con-
ducting such stops,96 and provided a list of acceptable relevant factors, including 
                                                                
 88. Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up For Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v. 
Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 615 (2012) (observing that even though the Supreme Court stated that presence in a 
“high-crime area” or association with drug users would not itself constitute reasonable suspicion, later 
courts “regularly [found] adequate grounds for suspicion based on factors similar to those initially found 
insufficient”) (citing David A. Harris, supra note 81, at 672–75). 
 89. David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth 
Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 435 (2003). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Evan Horowitz, A Look at Racial Profiling, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/11/01/what-are-arguments-for-and-against-racial-profil-
ing/F0DlnqVZk7aUXolRuHc0LJ/story.html; Ranjana Natarajan, Racial Profiling Has Destroyed Public Trust in 
Police. Cops Are Exploiting Our Weak Laws Against It., WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyed-public-trust-in-police-cops-
are-exploiting-our-weak-laws-against-it/?utm_term=.762ebdfa5f98. See also George Higgins et al., Explor-
ing the Influence of Race Relations and Public Safety Concerns on Public Support for Racial Profiling During 
Traffic Stops, 12 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 12, 18 (2010) (examining public perception of whether racial 
profiling exists, is widespread, and is justified). 
 92. Harris, supra note 81, at 660. Professor Harris writes that gradually, the Court began to ex-
plicitly call for more deference to police officers working the beat. Id. at 665. The “whole picture” concept 
that emerged from United States v. Cortez, for example, “directly instructed lower courts to defer to the 
judgment of police.” Id. at 666. This deference explicitly was in favor of the common-sense conclusions 
arrived at by police officers; these “common-sense conclusions” were relied upon in later cases dealing with 
drug courier profiles to justify police action based on “certain broad categories that, in collective police 
experience, describe a person” likely engaged in criminal activity. Id. 
 93. 422 U.S. 873, 886 (1975).  
 94. Id. at 875. 
 95. Id. at 886. 
 96. Id. at 881, 878–79 (acknowledging public interest in “prevent[ing] the illegal entry of aliens 
at the Mexican border” due to job scarcity or the implicated extra burdens on social safety nets). 
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the “characteristic appearance” of someone living in another country.97 While at 
face value this perhaps seemed like a victory against racial profiling (i.e., stops could 
not be based solely on race), the Court’s reasoning relied on the belief that Mexican 
appearance increased the likelihood of alienage.98 Brignoni-Ponce clearly cemented 
the Court’s approval of race in conjunction with other factors. Justice Douglas con-
curred in the judgment but lamented “the weakening of the Fourth Amendment” 
as an already weak reasonable suspicion standard had “come to be viewed as a legal 
construct for the regulation of a general investigatory police power[,]” allowing 
stops on “the flimsiest of justifications.”99 The significance of this decision for local 
policing also became clear, as after Brignoni-Ponce, law enforcement could rely on 
“Mexican appearance” as a factor—though not the sole one—to make stops.100 
A year after Brignoni-Ponce, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,101 the Court 
took up a case with remarkably similar facts to Brignoni-Ponce, except “the defend-
ants were stopped and apprehended not by a roving patrol, but at a fixed check-
point.”102 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court ruled that the decision of an officer to refer 
a vehicle for secondary inspection did not have to be based on individual suspicion, 
and that Mexican appearance could be one of several factors for this decision.103 
“[I]t is constitutional,” the Court said, “to refer motorists selectively to the 
secondary inspection area . . . on the basis of criteria that would not sustain 
a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are 
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no 
constitutional violation.” . . . A person’s ancestry, as manifested in his ap-
pearance, could indeed form at least part of the basis for an enforcement 
officer’s decision about whom to stop, question, and search.104 
                                                                
 97. Id. at 886–87. 
 98. Id. (“The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to 
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-
Americans to ask if they are aliens.”). Notably, the Ninth Circuit has since departed from this dictum, con-
cluding in United States v. Montero-Camargo that the significant demographic changes to the Southwest 
and Far West made race “of such little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor 
where particularized or individualized suspicion is required.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 
1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of 
the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious 
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1033 n.159 (2010). 
 99. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 889, 890 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 100. Johnson, supra note 98, at 1009. See also Harris, supra note 89, at 43031 (“[W]hile Brignoni-
Ponce appears to restrict the use of ethnic appearance as a factor in deciding whether reasonable suspicion 
exists, it actually does so only in the most narrow sense: in situations where ethnic appearance is the only 
factor involved. And it leaves the door open to using ethnic appearance when it is among several factors.”). 
 101. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 102. Harris, supra note 89, at 431. 
 103. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563. 
 104. Harris, supra note 89, at 432 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563). 
 
424 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
Understandably, the Court seemed cautious to apply the reasoning from a 
border patrol case to those within the country’s interior.105 After all, the role of bor-
der patrol may extend from enforcing criminal violations of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to enforcing civil violations.106 However, the appearance of alienage 
was relevant to the criminal violation suspected or discovered—illegal smuggling, 
in both cases.107 In both Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, the Border Patrol of-
                                                                
 105. JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31130, RACIAL PROFILING: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 5 
(2012). In acknowledging this caution, I would like to point out that the term “reasonable suspicion” has 
similar implications for ICE officers as it does local law enforcement; all searches and seizures are subject to 
Fourth Amendment review. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). An ICE officer can 
ask questions of anyone she believes to be an alien, but must have reasonable suspicion that the individual 
is “engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the United States” in order to 
briefly detain him for questioning. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2017). An ICE officer may even arrest without a 
warrant if she has reasonable suspicion that the individual is violating immigration laws, if there is a likeli-
hood of the individual’s escaping “before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) 
(2012); 8 CFR § 287.8(c)(2) (2017). Unlike state officers, ICE officers are authorized to enforce both civil and 
criminal immigration violations. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41423, 
AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 10 (2012). As it plays out on the 
ground, “reasonable suspicion” is no different in practice between ICE and state officers except for jurisdic-
tion of enforcement; ICE officers can use Terry and its progeny to target those who most look like they are 
undocumented aliens. 
 106. The most significant difference between these two types of violations is that civil immigra-
tion violations generally can only be enforced by federal immigration authorities (or those delegated federal 
power through partnerships with the federal government—see infra Section III.A) whereas criminal immi-
gration violations can be enforced by both federal and state authorities. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 105, 
at 10. Therefore, that federal immigration and border patrol authorities were the officers in question in 
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte does not necessarily preclude these cases’ later application, as they 
were enforcing violations that local law enforcement could also enforce. See generally United States v. Ra-
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ficers stopped defendants on suspicion of criminal immigration violations—know-
ingly transporting illegal immigrants in violation of the Immigration Nationality 
Act.108 In these cases, the Court found that appearance of alienage by way of race 
was relevant to officers in “detecting illegal entry and smuggling[,]”109 and that race 
could be dispositive for choosing to refer drivers for increased levels of search and 
seizure on suspicion of illegal entry and smuggling.110 Even though the Court had 
been clear in Terry that it would not sanction “intrusions . . . based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches,”111 these cases working together gave law 
enforcement the ability to point to racial or ethnic characteristics when viewed as 
predictive of criminal activity.112 
Race was even further highlighted in the metaphorical constellation of facts 
that could constitute reasonable suspicion as lower courts struggled with the use of 
two factors together—that of location and evasion.113 An individual’s presence in a 
“high crime area” was dismissed by the Court as a sole factor for reasonable suspi-
cion in Brown v. Texas, where the sole basis of the stop was the subject’s presence 
in an area known for narcotics trafficking.114 As it did in Brignoni-Ponce, by leaving 
unanswered the question of whether presence in a high crime area could ever be 
part of the basis for reasonable suspicion, the Court implied that it could be.115 
Evasion—walking away from or avoiding encounters with police—was a mixed 
bag: lower courts split on whether evasion could constitute a sole basis for reason-
able suspicion, with four courts determining that it could and a number of states 
and circuits finding that it could not.116 Even though the Court had stated unequiv-
ocally that an individual has the constitutional right to avoid the police, the courts 
accepting evasion as grounds for reasonable suspicion equated avoiding the police 
with guilt.117 It was not until 2000 that the Court examined and upheld a Terry stop 
in Illinois v. Wardlow, based on the two factors: flight from the police in an area 
known for heavy narcotics trafficking.118 Here, the Court also pointed out that 
“nervous, evasive behavior” was also a relevant factor.119 As observed by Professor 
Harris, “allowing stops based only on the fact that the individual observed falls into 
the category of having an unusual reaction to the police is likely to sweep in many 
people as suspects without any real suspicion of their involvement in criminal activ-
ity.”120 
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While not expressly race-based, using location and evasion together targets 
minorities because all too often “high crime areas” are coded terms for “inner city 
neighborhoods,” where class and race segregation near-overlap.121 Professor David 
Harris writes that this segregation leads to the synonymy of minority neighbor-
hoods and higher crime and springs from a number of socioeconomic factors caus-
ing minorities to live and work in these neighborhoods.122 These “high crime” areas 
are frequently the focus of “hot spot policing,”123 a police strategy that has received 
significant praise for effectiveness in targeting “small units of geography with high 
rates of crime.”124 Hot spot policing strategies are varied, but may be as simple as 
police officers spending more time at “hot spots.”125 As a result, however, minori-
ties may be caught in a vicious cycle of avoiding encounters with police because 
they are more likely to be stopped due to where they live and being more likely to 
be stopped because they avoid encounters with police.126 Yet as the influence of 
Terry is traced through cases the law “effectively allows police nearly complete dis-
cretion to stop [minorities] . . . in crime-prone urban neighborhoods.”127 
Significantly, it was a case that does not flow directly from Terry—and there-
fore does not necessarily qualify as Terry’s progeny—that helps fill the gaps of the 
Court’s allowance of race in policing on less than probable cause.128 In Whren v. 
United States, vice officers in southeast Washington, D.C. saw a dark SUV with two 
black occupants stopped at a stop sign in a “high drug area”;129 suspecting drug ac-
tivity but without any evidence other than the race of the occupants, their location, 
and the car they were driving, the officers were making a U-turn to follow the SUV 
when it made a sudden right turn without signaling and sped off.130 The officers 
pursued, stopped the SUV, and discovered large amounts of crack cocaine and 
other drugs inside the vehicle.131 
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On appeal from their convictions for possession with intent to distribute, the 
defendants argued that the drugs discovered should be suppressed because the 
traffic stop was pretextual: the stop was based on the assumption that young black 
men in SUVs with temporary tags must be carrying drugs.132 They asked the Court 
to examine the motives of the officers performing the stop, underlining the need 
for a “would have” test—“a stop is valid only if under the same circumstances a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop, absent an impermissible pur-
pose”133—instead of the pretextual stop-permitting “could have” test, where an of-
ficer can stop if there is probable cause of any sort, even for a minor infraction.134 
The Court rejected the “would have” test, arguing that it would not be workable to 
determine an officer’s state of mind on every single stop and that such a holding 
would contradict other holdings regarding an acting officer’s motives in a search or 
seizure.135 Improper motives (e.g., race) leading to disparate treatment could be 
remedied instead through Equal Protection challenges, the Court stated, not 
through application of the exclusionary rule.136 
The Court’s refusal to examine an officer’s state of mind—and its assumption 
that an Equal Protection claim could catch the officers with improper motives—ce-
mented the expansive, pervasive role of policing requiring less than actual, particu-
larized probable cause. First, Terry drew non-consensual encounters on less than 
probable cause into the protection of the Fourth Amendment.137 Though the Court 
specified that ethnic appearance, presence in a high-crime area, and evasive or 
avoidant behavior could not be used as the sole basis for a reasonable suspicion 
stop,138 later cases emphasizing deference to officers’ judgment provided room for 
lower courts to differ as to the use of these factors together.139 The significance of 
Terry’s progeny, therefore, encompasses more than establishing which factors 
would pass muster: it signaled an era of extreme deference to the training and ex-
perience of police officers. After Whren this deference meant a blind eye to evi-
dence of improper motive if there was sufficient basis for a pretextual stop.140 
B. The Well-Documented Harms of Terry to Minority Populations 
Terry v. Ohio and its progeny have faced severe criticism in the last fifty years. 
A vast body of scholarship exists about the dangers of an ill-defined reasonable sus-
picion standard, how it gives officers excessive discretion to stop, and the “parlor 
game” the courts encourage officers to play in justifying the stops.141 Far more 
deeply felt, however, are the harms inflicted on minority populations. As described 
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in exhaustive detail in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff, the tools given 
to police—when exercised on less than adequate cause—provide “reason to target 
pedestrians in an arbitrary manner.”142 The harms that result when the law brings 
this targeting under Constitutional protection are felt deeply among minority com-
munities. New York City’s stop-and-frisk program—also the subject of much schol-
arship—illustrates this well, showing the human impact of Terry.  
The Court’s emphasis on “specific articulable facts” in Terry v. Ohio has been 
criticized for the difficulty of pinning down its definition and the impossibility of 
quantifying its weight.143 The Court stated that “inchoate” and “inarticulate 
hunches” would not pass muster, but pointed only to the ability of an officer to 
articulate specific facts—and the inferences he could draw from these facts based 
on his experiences—to establish “reasonable suspicion.”144 Professor Katz writes 
that “[t]he Court failed to adequately define an ‘investigatory stop,’ leading later 
courts to harden the definition[.]”145 This has given rise to a vast constellation of 
potential facts that can serve as the basis of reasonable suspicion; Judge Wiener of 
the Fifth Circuit decried this in United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, pointing out the array 
of often-contradictory factors allowed for a reasonable suspicion vehicle stop in 
Fifth Circuit cases: 
[T]he driver was suspiciously dirty, shabbily dressed and unkept or the 
driver was too clean; . . . the driver would not make eye contact with the 
agent, or the driver made eye contact too readily; the driver appeared 
nervous (or the driver even appeared too cool, calm, and collected) . . .  
and on and on ad nauseam.146 
Quantifying reasonable suspicion—calculating the probability of criminal 
wrongdoing—is even more difficult. Scholar William Stuntz proposes that if proba-
ble cause means it is “more-likely-than-not” crime will occur or has occurred, rea-
sonable suspicion may be “something like a one-in-five or one-in-four chance.”147 
This difficulty of quantification is partially due to courts’ reliance on reasonable sus-
picion’s relationship with probable cause: “[r]easonable suspicion requires some 
degree of certainty, which is less than probable cause, and police must articulate 
the grounds for that suspicion.”148 As a result, reasonable suspicion is a constitu-
tionally immunized standard that justifies a stop even when it is more probable that 
the subject is, in fact, innocent of any suspected criminality. 
More concerning than the difficulty of quantifying “reasonable suspicion” is 
the fact that “[i]n most stops and frisks, the articulable suspicion is simply 
wrong.”149 As a result of a settlement regarding the NYPD’s broad use of stop and 
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frisk, the department was required to track its stop and frisks.150 This data was a 
great boon for plaintiffs in the class-action bias suit (as most jurisdictions do not 
require stop data to be tracked); the data showed that of more-than-half-a-million 
stops over a single year, only about 50,000 led to arrests or summons.151 Jeffrey 
Fagan—the plaintiffs’ expert witness in Floyd—also analyzed the same set of data 
to see if “reasonable suspicion” stops had any more crime reductive effect than 
“probable cause” stops; they did not.152 As Fifth Circuit Judge Wiener emphasized 
in Zapata-Ibarra, “Bragging about netting 30 apprehensions out of 200 stops is anal-
ogous to a major league baseball player's bragging about a .150 batting average—
hardly an all-star performance.”153 
Ultimately, lowering of a standard for a stop—and expanding the factors to 
allow for such stops—amplifies other tools allowing searches and seizures on less 
than pure probable cause. This “array of instruments,” Justice Sotomayor wrote in 
Utah v. Strieff, allows officers to “probe and examine” people—and use what they 
find to confirm their initial hunches.154 Justice Sotomayor described in rapid-fire de-
tail the full range of possible officer control, from a Terry “reasonable suspicion” 
stop to pretextual stops allowed by Whren, from the factors allowed for a stop to 
the searches that may follow incident to an arrest from any infraction or discovered 
outstanding warrant, from the invasion of privacy at the stationhouse to the “civil 
death” of discrimination flowing from an arrest record.155 Most disturbing is that all 
of these indignities can lawfully flow from stops where the chance that the subject 
is innocent is far greater than the chance that the subject is not. Legitimizing this 
conduct “implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a car-
ceral state, just waiting to be catalogued.”156 
Consequently, Terry’s legitimation of racial profiling has left deep scars on 
communities of color, starting with harms experienced by individuals targeted by 
race-based policing. Professor Stuntz theorized four types of harm experienced by 
individuals as follows: (1) injury to the subject’s individual privacy rights (being 
stopped, being patted down, or having containers searched); (2) “targeting harm” 
(“the injury suffered by one who is singled out by the police and publicly treated 
like a criminal suspect”); (3) injury flowing from treatment based on race (feeling 
that the stop was based on the subject’s race); and (4) injury flowing from police 
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violence (both physical injury because of excessive force and fear that it will be ap-
plied).157 These harms work together to alienate members of the community from 
authorities; in severe cases, such as in New York City, they deepen racial divisions 
and create an environment of being “under siege.”158 
New York City provides a telling illustration of the harms felt by communities 
of color. Though “stop-and-frisk” was rendered a lawful police practice in New York 
in 1964,159 the New York Police Department established an aggressive stop-and-
frisk program by the late 1990s aimed at addressing the City’s crime problem in 
certain high-crime neighborhoods.160 In 1999, this practice was challenged by a class 
action lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights in Daniels v. City of 
New York; as part of the 2003 settlement the NYPD was required to track stop-and-
frisk data and turn it over to the Center.161 When released data indicated the City 
was not complying with the terms of the settlement, the Center filed Floyd v. City 
of New York.162 
The data revealed that stops were targeted to very specific neighborhoods. At 
night, a stretch of about eight blocks in Brownsville, Brooklyn, for example, would 
be blanketed with police cruisers and officers patrolling the public housing com-
plexes.163 Neighborhoods targeted were mostly neighborhoods of color, with the 
least stops in white-dominant neighborhoods.164 Those targeted included kids in 
middle school, and it was common knowledge it was because of skin color.165 One 
young man, fourteen-years-old, lamented that mere miles away, “white kids in 
Manhattan have no idea cops can frisk you for no reason[.]”166 Some young men 
were stopped so frequently that a football coach at Thomas Jefferson High School 
allowed his players to wear their helmets while leaving practice to signal to police 
they were not gang members.167 For these targeted neighborhoods, occupants felt 
like they were under siege, unable to leave their homes without the threat of being 
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stopped at any time.168 This effect on these neighborhoods was not accidental, ei-
ther, having been referenced by the Commissioner and Mayor alike.169 
At the individual level, the indignity of being stopped extended far past incon-
venience. Community members in New York City described these encounters as 
traumatic and humiliating, leaving people “feeling unsafe, fearful of police, afraid 
to leave their homes, or re-living the experience whenever they see police.”170 The 
fear caused many to change the way they lived—dressing or fixing their hair differ-
ently, making different transportation plans, and always bringing ID or pieces of 
mail to prove identity and legally belonging in that neighborhood when going out 
in case of a stop.171 Simply being present in their own neighborhoods was suspect: 
 If I’m in a group of people, you can’t be in front of the building you 
live in. If you show the police officers your ID that says you live [there], 
they tell you to go in the house or walk somewhere else; you can’t be here 
on the block. They want to kick you off the block. They want to kick you 
out the building. We can’t be outside?... So what can we do?172 
At the community level, stop-and-frisk in New York led to distrust of police, 
where authorities were seen less as protection and more as instruments of con-
trol.173 According to a study by the Vera Institute, individuals who were stopped 
more frequently were less willing to report future crimes—even if they were the 
victims.174 Residents of targeted neighborhoods felt the hostility, and many re-
turned it. Even if there was a short-term effect on crime, the resulting alienation of 
young people stopped for no reason may “lead to worse citizens in the future.”175 
The individual is broken down, made to fear interactions with police, and subjected 
to the humiliation of a near-suspicionless stop.176 The neighborhood is occupied. 
The community is amputated from itself as people fear to leave their homes. 
What occurred in New York City provides a dire warning for what happens 
when the discretionary power of Terry is used with official policymaker sanction to 
target populations of color. However, it is not the only place where community 
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harm has been replicated. Consider Philadelphia, where a class-action lawsuit con-
cerning stop-and-frisk practices was settled in 2011.177 As part of the settlement 
terms the Philadelphia Police Department was required to track and release data 
on stops, but as of mid-2017, the data continued to suggest that pedestrian stops 
were still based on race.178 One woman told Newsweek that she had been stopped 
while returning from a drugstore, and then was “ordered . . . to get inside her 
house.”179 “‘I wasn’t doing any mischief. That makes me feel like I can’t trust the 
police[,]’” she explained.180 
Those who have been stopped and frisked based on “reasonable suspicion”—
or who suspect they have been targeted because of their race—may be less upset 
about the stop itself than what the stop meant: that the police are not there to 
protect them, but are acting on the assumption that their race is somehow predic-
tive of criminality.181 Race-based policing has left deep generational scars. Parents 
wrestle with how—or whether—to inform their black sons about the extra atten-
tion they may receive from law enforcement.182 The feeling of standing out or being 
subject to extra attention by police officers breaks down trust with local authori-
ties,183 leaving many feeling empty “due to the lack of a meaningful relationship 
between the police and members of the African-American community.”184 
The effect of Terry and its progeny, therefore, is not just that officers now had 
the authorization to make stops on less than probable cause—stops that Justice 
Warren acknowledged in Terry may be used for minority harassment.185 More than 
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that, Terry widened officers’ discretionary power so much that as crime rates in-
creased in the bigger cities and the war on drugs began,186 the need arose for offic-
ers to narrow their focus somehow. This vast amount of discretion has allowed of-
ficers to operate on profiles of “the right people” for crimes.187 Unfortunately, as 
envisioned and realized in New York City, this discretionary space to decide who to 
stop—when officially sanctioned by policymakers as it was by the NYPD—also has 
the side effect of deterring presence: occupying neighborhoods, discouraging resi-
dents from being in public, and encouraging them to hide in their homes. As will be 
discussed below, state policymakers who are familiar with the power and perva-
siveness of local law enforcement can use the tools at their disposal to achieve po-
litical goals. In the context of immigration, states wanting to achieve the political 
goal of more effective immigration enforcement have learned to make use of the 
discretionary power afforded by Terry. 
III. STATE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES AFTER ARIZONA V. UNITED 
STATES: “STOP, FRISK, AND SHOW ME YOUR PAPERS” 
Given the tools available to local law enforcement and the presence-deterring 
effect of those tools, it is not surprising that states have chosen to co-opt local law 
enforcement into immigration enforcement. By the numbers alone, states and pol-
icymakers alike are aware of the “force multipl[ying]” power of local law enforce-
ment in enforcing immigration laws.188 However, because the field of immigration 
falls under Congress’s plenary power and is enforced through agencies in the De-
partment of Homeland Security, states must tread carefully when stepping into im-
migration enforcement themselves.189 
The focus on local law enforcement as part of immigration enforcement is not 
new. When Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), it included what became known as § 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), allowing local agencies to partner directly 
with the federal government to enforce immigration law.190 Even before then, ICE 
and its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), used detain-
ers to formally request that local agencies hold detained individuals for ICE pick 
up.191 However, these are federal initiatives that are not mandatory.192 As a result, 
local agencies have had discretion to decide whether to partner with the federal 
government through these avenues. When city police departments or sheriffs’ of-
fices decline to partner or adopt policies of minimal cooperation with immigration 
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enforcement, but the state governments that fund them want full cooperation with 
the federal government, the result is a clash at the state legislative level as the state 
government asserts its authority. When Arizona passed its groundbreaking omnibus 
bill S.B. 1070 in 2011, the confines of state authority to step into the immigration 
enforcement field were tested, leading to few guidelines for states to follow. 
In the last decade, states have taken matters into their own hands to address 
illegal immigration, citing federal inaction. In 2005, then-Governor of Arizona Janet 
Napolitano declared a state of emergency in the state, joining New Mexico Gover-
nor Bill Richardson in earmarking funds to combat illegal immigration and drug traf-
ficking; the governors decried the federal government’s failure to secure the south-
ern border.193 By 2010, there were estimates the number of unauthorized immi-
grants had increased by more than five times since the 1990s.194 Arizona S.B. 1070 
was introduced and passed in early 2010, igniting a wildfire of controversy.195 
Not surprisingly, the wave of immigration enforcement legislation has not 
subsided.196 Recently, Texas has stepped into the fray with S.B. 4, another omnibus 
bill targeting the same kind of policies S.B. 1070 prohibited.197 Idaho followed suit 
shortly thereafter, introducing a near-identical bill.198 This Part examines first the 
formal mechanisms for cooperation between local agencies as well as the reasons 
many agencies decline to enter into these agreements. This Part then turns to the 
rules of the road delineated by Arizona v. United States, sketching out the next 
round of legal battles for “sanctuary policies.” Finally, this Part concludes with a 
discussion of the modern wave of state legislation, identifying the common threads 
of anti-sanctuary legislation. 
A. The Impact of Formal Partnerships Between Immigration Agencies and Local 
Law Enforcement 
Local agencies have a range of partnership options with the federal govern-
ment for immigration enforcement, most filling in personnel gaps by bringing local 
officers on board and authorizing them to enforce immigration laws.199 While direct 
partnerships with ICE are not the focus of this Article, the impact of these partner-
ships on communities has led many entities to avoid cooperation of this sort.200 The 
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resulting policies of limited cooperation are often the target of state legislation try-
ing to enter the immigration enforcement field.201 This section will briefly lay out 
the mechanisms for local entities to partner with the federal government and the 
impacts these partnerships have had. 
The formal mechanisms for partnership with the federal government can be 
divided into pre-arrest and post-arrest—i.e., whether the mechanisms kick in be-
fore or after a lawful arrest. The post-arrest formal mechanisms are many but cen-
ter on information sharing and compliance with detainers. Information sharing it-
self is mandatory through Secure Communities, a program through which an ar-
restee’s fingerprint information is shared with ICE via the FBI. This information is 
checked against immigration databases maintained by the Department of Home-
land Security.202 ICE then determines whether to issue a detainer for the individ-
ual.203 Once a local agency receives a detainer request from ICE, there is yet another 
opportunity for agencies to cooperate with ICE by honoring the detainer request.204 
In a detainer request, ICE requests that the individual in question be held for forty-
eight hours—and if ICE does not take custody in that period, that the individual be 
released.205 
287(g) agreements provide both pre- and post-arrest mechanisms. 206  287(g) 
programs are entered into through Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) between ICE 
and the local enforcement entity.207 When ICE and local entities partner in official 
287(g) programs, local officers are “deputized” and have great latitude to use all the 
tools available to them to enforce immigration.208 Deputized officers on the street 
are allowed to exercise the same amount of power as ICE officers—question on 
reasonable suspicion of alienage, detain on reasonable suspicion of unlawful pres-
ence, and warrantless arrest on reasonable suspicion of violation of immigration 
law.209 
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Since President Trump took office, the Department of Homeland Security has 
focused on expanding 287(g) program agreements and honoring detainer re-
quests.210 However, many jurisdictions refuse to enter into these partnerships, cit-
ing the civil rights and social cost. The civil rights cost for communities is well-docu-
mented. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a re-
port identifying significant shortcomings in the 287(g) program, namely the lack of 
controls that would allow ICE to make sure the program worked as hoped.211 The 
report also indicated that community concern about racial profiling was prevalent 
in a vast majority of the 287(g) jurisdictions examined.212 The Department of Justice, 
for example, found such great evidence of civil rights violations in Alamance County, 
North Carolina that a lawsuit was filed and their 287(g) status was revoked; there, 
the DOJ concluded that deputies targeted Latinos in traffic stops and through check-
points in Latino neighborhoods.213 In Maricopa County, Arizona, the Department of 
Justice brought suit and suspended the 287(g) program after intentional and sys-
tematic discrimination against Latinos; this extended from the very first contact 
with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office—Latinos were four to nine times more 
likely to be stopped than non-Latinos—to detention at the Maricopa County Jail, 
where human rights abuses abounded.214 
The social costs are equally great. A study by the Migration Policy Institute 
showed that in 287(g)-partnered counties, immigrants avoided public places, dis-
trusted police, and failed to report crimes as frequently—even when they were vic-
tims.215 Another survey conducted by the University of Illinois at Chicago and Lake 
Research Partners indicated that many Latinos were reluctant to cooperate with 
police on other investigations due to fear that their immigration status or that of 
people they know would be questioned.216 Every potential encounter with police 
could be an “opportunity to investigate . . . immigration status[,]” so Latinos dis-
trusted the very force that should protect them.217 One domestic violence survivor 
recounted her mistrust: “‘My family always told me to never call the cops,’ [she] 
said. ‘My family told me that the only thing worse than the beatings was the police, 
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the deportation.’”218 Many jurisdictions therefore avoid 287(g) partnerships be-
cause of the erosion of trust between immigrant communities and their local au-
thorities.219 
Even though the opportunities are vast for local entities to partner with the 
federal government, the costs are great. Many local entities prefer to maintain good 
community relations, citing the need for trust between the Latino community and 
the police. Others look at the financial costs—certainly contributed to by liability 
exposure from the potential abuses of civil rights that the partnerships are associ-
ated with. However, when local entities establish policies of restricting their coop-
eration with the federal government—and their funding states disagree—a unique 
problem emerges: what can states do to curb these policies against enforcement 
when entities refuse to directly partner? As discussed in the next section, after Ari-
zona v. United States, the answer is clearer. States, while limited by the confines of 
federalism, have the means to enforce immigration indirectly through local enforce-
ment. As a result, states have moved toward using the very tools of policing as tools 
of immigration enforcement with the goal of deterring—and erasing—undocu-
mented immigrant presence. 
B. Arizona v. United States: The Rules of the Road for State Legislation on 
Immigration Enforcement 
The direct enforcement methods discussed above have deterred many juris-
dictions from partnering; the resulting community distrust even has spurred official 
policies of restricted cooperation with immigration authorities. For state legislators 
motivated by anti-immigrant political goals, the state authority appears a foolproof 
way to strongarm jurisdictions into full cooperation with federal immigration en-
forcement. However, as learned by Arizona, the way this cooperation is authorized 
or mandated can be the difference between a workable provision and one that is 
enjoined before enactment. This section aims to explore the rules governing the 
immigration enforcement road. It discusses the legislative intent of Arizona S.B. 
1070 to eliminate sanctuary policies, its major provisions, as well as the preemption 
arguments analyzed by the Supreme Court. This Part explains that after Arizona, the 
Court unequivocally established that there was space for states to indirectly enforce 
immigration at the local level, and concludes that while many state enforcement 
efforts are preempted by federal immigration law, the Court has allowed “Show Me 
Your Papers” provisions to stand. States that mandate local officers to ask about 
immigration status therefore can use encounters with local law enforcement as a 
tool for state enforcement due to § 1373’s federal restriction on the sharing of im-
migration status information. 
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When Arizona S.B. 1070 was passed, the bill’s sponsor, Russell Pearce, told 
reporters that the bill’s purpose was “to eliminate sanctuary policies[.]”220 Not sur-
prisingly, the purpose of Arizona S.B. 1070 cannot be fully understood without a 
discussion of “sanctuary policies.” As noted above, many jurisdictions are so con-
cerned with the potential consequences of being associated with federal immigra-
tion enforcement that they enact policies of non-cooperation.221 In broad strokes, 
a sanctuary policy is a formal or informal policy adopted by an entity that limits its 
own compliance with immigration authorities or enforcement of immigration law, 
but these policies can take many forms.222 Some jurisdictions prohibit their officers 
from routinely inquiring into immigration status during stops,223 others do not 
honor ICE requests to assume custody of immigrants identified for removal,224 while 
still others heavily restrict ICE presence in jails.225 
The concept of “sanctuary” jurisdictions is not new to this era, stretching as 
far back as ancient Hebrew culture.226 In the United States, sanctuary policies 
sprang up in the 1980s in response to perceived mishandling of Central American 
humanitarian crises by the United States government.227 Today, the term “sanctu-
ary city” has polarizing effects, despite the difficulty of pinning down a definition.228 
Jurisdictions that have policies limiting immigration enforcement may not even call 
themselves “sanctuary” jurisdictions because of the attached controversy.229 
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In response to the perceived flagrancy of sanctuary policies, S.B. 1070 was 
proposed and passed.230 It was the first of its kind; no state legislative campaign 
before it was as strict or ambitious.231 S.B. 1070 began with a sweeping, explicit 
statement of intent: 
The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition 
through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government 
agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work to-
gether to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens 
and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United 
States.232 
S.B. 1070 prohibited officials and agencies from having policies that limited or 
restricted “enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent per-
mitted by federal law[,]” or from restricting sharing individuals’ immigration status 
with ICE.233 It also required law enforcement officers to make a “reasonable at-
tempt” to find out the immigration status of individuals during any lawful contact if 
the officer had reasonable suspicion the individual was unlawfully present in the 
country; this provision became known as the “Show Me Your Papers” section of the 
bill.234 S.B. 1070 also required agencies to transfer convicted individuals to ICE cus-
tody,235 and authorized law enforcement officers to arrest based on probable cause 
that an individual was unlawfully present in the country.236 The bill also created a 
criminal violation of state trespassing for undocumented immigrants “present on 
any public or private land” in Arizona.237 It allowed officers to stop a vehicle based 
on reasonable suspicion that a driver was transporting undocumented immi-
grants,238 created a misdemeanor for stopping to pick up unauthorized workers,239 
and created an affirmative defense for entrapment for employers who hired unau-
thorized workers.240 Inter alia, a number of provisions provided for penalties, in-
cluding waiving of sovereign immunity through a private right of action against an 
agency with a policy of limiting immigration enforcement.241 
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After S.B. 1070 was signed into law in April 2010, the federal government filed 
suit, challenging whether states had any role at all in immigration enforcement.242 
The Department of Justice’s lawsuit sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the 
basis that the state of Arizona was infringing upon a field of regulation exclusively 
held by the federal government by stepping into immigration enforcement.243 
While this case played out—and was ultimately heard by the Supreme Court—other 
states began to pass their own versions of the omnibus bill.244 
The Justice Department’s challenge of S.B. 1070 was chiefly on grounds of fed-
eral preemption under the Supremacy Clause.245 When a state enacts a law step-
ping beyond territory normally left to the States and into territory regulated by fed-
eral law, the federal government may challenge this enactment as preempted.246 
Three types of preemption may be possible. First, express preemption concerns 
state laws that clearly disagree with, and therefore are expressly preempted by, 
federal law.247 Second, field preemption occurs when federal legislation on a sub-
ject occupies so much space in that “field” that it can be inferred that “Congress left 
no room for the States to supplement it.”248 Third, conflict preemption may occur 
in two ways and focuses on how carrying out the state law affects compliance with 
the federal law and its objective.249 A state law is conflict preempted when it is 
physically impossible to comply with both the state and the federal law; a state law 
may also be conflict preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the federal law’s ob-
jective.250 
In Arizona v. United States, the Court examined four provisions of S.B. 1070 
for these types of preemption, concluding that all but one attempted to replicate 
or extend past the federal scheme.251 In so concluding, the Court delineated some 
clear rules of the road regarding alien registration, immigrant employment, and 
warrantless arrests.252 As to the remaining provision—the “Show Me Your Papers” 
provision—the Court indicated states could regulate in this manner but did not fore-
close applied legal challenges.253 
First, the Court was clear that provisions that replicated federal legislative 
schemes for immigration enforcement were enjoined.254 For example, states could 
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not enter the field of alien registration, even if they replicate federal regulations in 
state regulation form.255 Section 3 created a new state misdemeanor for “failure to 
complete or carry” an alien registration document.256 The Court ruled that this pro-
vision was field preempted by Congress’s full occupation of the field of alien regis-
tration.257 
Second, the Court ruled that attempts to prohibit undocumented immigrants 
from soliciting work were preempted because they not only stepped into a field 
occupied by federal immigration schemes but proved an obstacle to achieving that 
scheme.258 Section 5(C) criminalized solicitation or application for work by an un-
documented immigrant.259 Because Congress intentionally entered the field of em-
ployment regulation as applied to immigrants and structured its existing regulation 
to penalize not the workers but the employers of undocumented immigrants, Ari-
zona’s attempt to criminalize immigrant workers was federally preempted.260 
Third, the Court ruled that states could not give state officers the same or 
more power to enforce immigration as federal officers, by enjoining the provision 
authorizing warrantless arrests by state officers based on possible removability.261 
Section 6 gave state police officers the power to arrest without a warrant if they 
have probable cause to believe that the subject “has committed any public offense 
that makes [him] removable from the United States.”262 This provision gave state 
officers greater power to arrest without a warrant than federal officers have—they 
are authorized to arrest without a warrant only if the subject is likely to flee before 
a warrant can be obtained—and for that reason was federally preempted by the 
process for removal that Congress had established.263 
On the other hand, the Court ruled that states were not facially preempted 
from mandating their officers to make reasonable attempts to determine immigra-
tion status of individuals otherwise lawfully stopped.264 The Court rejected the Gov-
ernment’s arguments about preemption, reasoning that Congress had encouraged 
information sharing with ICE, and emphasizing that “reasonable attempts” to gain 
this information would not unconstitutionally prolong the stop.265 Section 2(B) of 
S.B. 1070 was not preempted because it was properly limited to avoid Constitu-
tional concerns, and Congress had clearly anticipated and encouraged communica-
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tion between state and federal officers regarding suspected immigration viola-
tions.266 Therefore, after Arizona, states may mandate reasonable attempts to in-
quire into and determine immigration status of individuals otherwise lawfully 
stopped.267 
The significance of the “Show Me Your Papers” provision’s survival cannot be 
underestimated, given 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a federal law that keeps government entities 
from prohibiting or restricting information sharing of individuals’ immigration sta-
tus with the federal government.268 In other words, if an undocumented immigrant 
is stopped for a traffic violation, and the officer’s routine inquiries do not include 
immigration status, there is no information about immigration status to share with 
the federal government, and the entity is still in compliance with § 1373. But if the 
immigrant is asked her immigration status, the enforcement entity cannot prevent 
that officer from transmitting her answer to federal immigration authorities. 
By ruling that Arizona’s “Show Me Your Papers” provision was not preempted, 
the Court threw open the doors for states to strongarm local enforcement into in-
formation gathering for the federal government. Now there would be vast amounts 
of immigration status information gathered because it was mandatory. Even though 
much of Arizona’s direct immigration enforcement framework was enjoined, the 
Supreme Court’s decision on Section 2(B) was still seen as a victory for Arizona and 
its goal of “attrition through enforcement.”269 Governor Jan Brewer insisted that 
“the heart of Senate Bill 1070 [had] been proven to be constitutional.”270 Litigation 
continued after Arizona v. United States, but ultimately the plaintiffs settled with 
the state in return for $1.4 million in legal fees and an informal opinion from Ari-
zona’s attorney general that narrowly limited use of Section 2(B).271 The provision 
would remain on the books and the constitutional ramifications of Arizona v. United 
States were cemented. 
Arizona meant more than delineating what states could do: it established that 
there was space within the field of immigration enforcement for states to occupy 
with legislation and without partnerships with the federal government.272 By allow-
ing states to mandate immigration inquiry, Arizona gave states the tools to under-
cut sanctuary policies at the baseline encounter with community members. Any 
lawful encounter with the police meant immigration status could be determined, 
and any immigration status information could be transmitted to the federal govern-
ment. The Government’s argument that there was no place for states had been re-
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jected outright. Arizona’s goal of “attrition through enforcement” could still be ac-
complished indirectly. These lessons were observed and taken to heart by states 
trying to accomplish the same goal. 
C. State Legislation Proliferates and Arizona’s Impact Solidifies 
After Arizona, circuit courts now had precedent to apply to the state initiatives 
that sprang up alongside S.B. 1070. Predictably, provisions that mimicked Ari-
zona’s—such as the “Show Me Your Papers” provision—were treated as Arizona 
instructed,273 but there were other pieces of state legislation that were different 
enough for which Arizona could only be an instructive analogy. This section dis-
cusses how Arizona was applied to 1070’s contemporaries and examine later efforts 
by states to specifically target and punish sanctuary jurisdictions. Then this section 
concludes that because Arizona established space for local law enforcement to en-
force immigration, state legislatures have built entire anti-sanctuary statutory 
schemes on initial encounters between law enforcement and civilians to achieve 
the goal of “attrition through enforcement” indirectly. 
In late 2012, the Eleventh Circuit applied Arizona to state statutes in Georgia 
and Alabama that were signed into law shortly after S.B. 1070. In Georgia, H.B. 87 
(“Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act”) contained twin provisions that 
the Eleventh Circuit enjoined and allowed.274 The first provision prohibited trans-
porting, moving, harboring, or concealing undocumented immigrants while com-
mitting another crime, or inducing undocumented immigrants to enter the state.275 
This was enjoined as conflict preempted because the provision replicated federal 
regulation.276 The second provision authorized officer investigation into immigra-
tion status if the officer had probable cause that the individual committed a crime; 
if the individual could not provide identification to verify his immigration status, the 
officer was authorized to “take any action authorized by state and federal law[.]”277 
In Alabama, H.B. 56 (“Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Act”) contained mirror provisions to Sections 3, 6, 5(C), and 2(B), which were en-
joined and allowed, respectively, by the Eleventh Circuit.278 
These decisions by the Eleventh Circuit were persuasive in subsequent deci-
sions concerning South Carolina’s Act 69.279 Twin subsections made it a state felony 
to transport, move, conceal, harbor, or shelter an undocumented immigrant—and 
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punished the undocumented immigrant for allowing herself to be so transported, 
concealed, etc.280 Another section made it a state misdemeanor for adults to fail to 
carry a certificate of alien registration, while yet another criminalized having false 
identification.281 These subsections were enjoined as preempted due to their simi-
larities to Arizona’s enjoined provisions.282 
Other states attempted to pass omnibus legislation like S.B. 1070 but were 
unsuccessful. Kansas, for example, introduced legislation about, inter alia, alien reg-
istration, verification of lawful status for any public benefit (including licenses is-
sued by the department of wildlife, parks, and tourism), E-Verify, and requiring of-
ficers to determine immigration status during any lawful stop.283 Mississippi intro-
duced two pieces of legislation that included requiring officers to determine immi-
gration status during a lawful stop, schools to verify the immigration status of en-
rolled children and their parents (and authorized sharing of this information with 
ICE), and even any political subdivision of the state to verify immigration status of 
anyone entering a “business transaction” with them.284 These bills died in commit-
tee.285 By 2013, it looked as though omnibus legislation had fallen out of popularity, 
with no omnibus legislation passed between 2014 and mid-2016.286 
Today, the tide is coming back in, and the latest wave of legislation targets 
sanctuary policies held at the local level. It started in states like North Carolina; 
there a 2013 omnibus bill much like Arizona’s was enacted over governor veto,287 
and in 2015 a smaller bill targeting unauthorized immigrant workers was passed, 
including a provision prohibiting entities from adopting sanctuary policies, ordi-
nances, or procedures.288 In the first half of 2017, more than 100 bills were pro-
posed in at least 36 states regarding sanctuary policies.289 In distinct focus today is 
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Texas’s S.B. 4 that contained many provisions designed to prevent local entities 
from adopting sanctuary policies.290 
Bills targeting sanctuary jurisdictions start with broad strokes, prohibiting lo-
cal entities from having any official policy of restricting immigration enforcement or 
compliance.291 Consider the text of Texas S.B. 4’s sanctuary policy provision, repli-
cated in Idaho S.B. 76/198: “A local entity or campus police department may not 
adopt, enforce, or endorse a policy under which the entity or department prohibits 
or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws.”292 Consequences can be 
severe. The common thread for these provisions is financial, such as threatening to 
withhold state funding to these jurisdictions—as in the proposed Idaho S.B. 
76/198.293 The first incarnation of this bill threatened withholding of all funds to an 
entity with a sanctuary policy, but a subsequent amendment reduced it to only a 
50% loss of state funds.294 Some states go much further than cutting off funding, 
such as Texas S.B. 4, which (like S.B. 1070) allows local entities to face civil penalties, 
but also permits elected or appointed officials to be removed from office for viola-
tion of the provision.295 Still other provisions waive sovereign immunity for sanctu-
ary jurisdictions, like S.B. 4 did “to the extent of liability created.”296 One such pro-
posed Florida bill, H.B. 9, recently passed its House, and opens sanctuary jurisdic-
tions up to liability if a person is injured by an undocumented immigrant upon proof 
that the sanctuary policy resulted “in such alien’s having access to the person in-
jured . . . .”297 
Other state provisions prohibit sanctuary policies at the critical pre-arrest 
stage by authorizing officers to make immigration status inquiries. While “Show Me 
Your Papers” provisions mandate that officers determine the immigration status of 
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individuals, the “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions proscribe local entity poli-
cies against asking about immigration status.298 In Texas’s capitol city, for example, 
Austin Police Department policy prevented officers from asking about immigration 
status.299 Texas S.B. 4 aimed to cut those policies out at the root; instead of man-
dating that officers make a “reasonable attempt” to determine immigration status 
(required by Arizona S.B. 1070’s § 2(B)), S.B. 4 prohibited local entities from having 
policies preventing an officer from doing so.300 Both “Show Me Your Papers” and 
“Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions work with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as an infor-
mation-gathering tool, because § 1373 proscribes local enforcement entities from 
restricting information sharing on individuals’ immigration status with the federal 
government.301 
In Texas, S.B. 4 was introduced in the Senate a week after the 2016 Presiden-
tial Election.302 By early 2017, Governor Greg Abbott had placed a target on sanctu-
ary cities, declaring that sanctuary cities were an “emergency item” so as to set the 
Texas GOP into motion to vote.303 S.B. 4 passed and was signed into law in May 
2017, to be effective September 1, 2017.304 The City of El Cenizo filed a complaint a 
day after S.B. 4 was signed into law; after the dust of other complaints settled and 
cases were consolidated, City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas emerged as the predom-
inant piece of litigation challenging S.B. 4.305 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, arguing that the anti-sanctuary provision that prohibited “endors-
ing” sanctuary policies violated the First Amendment because it required state em-
ployees to take positions in favor of limiting immigration enforcement.306 Plaintiffs 
also challenged the anti-sanctuary provision on vagueness under the Due Process 
Clause—which “requires that a law give reasonable notice of what conduct it pro-
hibits.”307 Among the other claims was a Fourth Amendment challenge to the re-
quirement that local entities honor all detainer requests, and a preemption chal-
lenge to provisions plaintiffs claimed duplicated the federal immigration scheme.308 
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The day before the law was to go into effect, the preliminary injunction was 
granted as to certain portions of provisions, but much of the bill stayed intact.309 In 
particular, District Judge Garcia was persuaded by the vagueness arguments con-
cerning the terms “endorse” and “materially limit,” and agreed with the Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the detainer compliance provision.310 These provisions 
were temporarily enjoined.311 However, this left the “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” 
provision intact, a fact not lost on the public.312 Within a month, a Fifth Circuit panel 
stayed the preliminary injunction on the detainer compliance provision, also clear-
ing the way for local and college police officers to assist federal immigration.313 Con-
sequently, Austin Police Chief Brian Manley announced a policy change on asking 
about immigration status within the department to comply with the law.314 In 
March  2018, the Fifth Circuit vacated in large part the district court’s injunctions, 
leaving S.B. 4 intact except for the “endorsement” provision.315 
After Arizona v. United States, the blueprint for “attrition through enforce-
ment” had been drafted. While the Court established in Arizona that suspicion of 
alienage would not create a separate ground for interrogation or arrest,316 the Court 
found no problem with mandated immigration inquiry.317 States could now force 
local officers to get the very information sanctuary jurisdictions were avoiding out 
of begrudging respect for the mandates of § 1373. As discussed below, the resulting 
environment for Latino communities is so uncomfortable that the undocumented 
are held in a state of siege, and some are forced to leave. 
IV. THE CONFLUENCE OF TERRY’S PROGENY AND STATE LEGISLATION: ERASING 
IMMIGRANT PRESENCE 
Professor Jeffrey Fagan refers to Terry v. Ohio as a Fourth Amendment “origi-
nal sin”; by throwing wide the doors of discretion to police officers looking to make 
stops “based on the very hunches that worried the Terry Court.”318 If this is Terry’s 
“original sin,” then the present sin is the way states have weaponized this tool of 
policing to achieve attrition through pre-arrest immigration enforcement. States 
have built entire legislative frameworks around co-opting immigration inquiry into 
each encounter. States combine Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard with “Show 
Me Your Papers” and “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions to indirectly enforce 
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immigration law without relying on the criminal justice system. Because the sweep-
ing majority of Terry stops sit outside the legal process when they do not result in 
arrests, the result is immigration enforcement that does not rely on the deportation 
pipeline; instead, the high volume of nonconsensual encounters into which immi-
gration inquiry is co-opted is feared and avoided by undocumented communities, 
resulting in self-deportation. 
This Part discusses how the legal confluence of Terry and “Show Me Your Pa-
pers” provisions play out, explaining that the immunization of Terry stops that do 
not result in an arrest from automatic judicial review provide a legal island ideal for 
amplification of anti-sanctuary and anti-immigrant goals. The Part then turn to the 
effect this has had on immigrant communities, emphasizing that this is the intent 
of state legislatures capitalizing on the confluence of Terry and “Show Me Your Pa-
pers” provisions. 
A. The Legal Confluence of Terry and Anti-Sanctuary Bills: Criminal Terry Stops as a 
Vehicle for Immigration Enforcement 
Arizona meant that immigration status could be investigated at the lowest 
level encounter with local law enforcement. After Terry, the lowest level encounter 
for a lawful stop by local law enforcement required only a very small amount of 
suspicion of criminality. Terry stops combine with “Show Me Your Papers” provi-
sions to achieve goals of attrition through enforcement, given the constitutional 
cover of “innocent” Terry stops against judicial review. Ultimately, “Show Me Your 
Papers” provisions change the very nature of the lowest level encounter; the “Can’t 
Keep Me From Asking” provisions inject uncertainty into encounters with law en-
forcement. 
Terry stops can be predicated on thin and contradictory facts—even describ-
ing wholly innocent behavior—in supporting a reasonable suspicion of particular-
ized criminality.319 An officer suspecting a crime is about to occur or is occurring 
may stop someone without enough evidence to substantiate an arrest for the same. 
The vast amount of infractions for which officers can stop, and the feeble amount 
of justification required for these stops, means officers must target neighborhoods 
and subjects they believe are likely to yield evidence of criminality.320 
Reasonable suspicion of crimes associated with poverty—such as loitering, va-
grancy, or turnstile jumping321—have disproportionately subjected minorities to a 
high volume of non-consensual lawful encounters with police.322 In the immigration 
enforcement context, an officer can use reasonable suspicion to lay the foundation 
for a lawful, non-consensual encounter with minority immigrants. Consider Ariel 
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Vences-Lopez in Minneapolis, who was asked for identification on suspicion of fare 
evasions; when he indicated he did not have any, the officer inquired into his immi-
gration status.323 Even though in this instance the officer inquired against depart-
ment policy, if the Minnesota State Legislature had passed “Show Me Your Papers” 
or “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions, the officer would be well within his job 
description to do so. 
States that mandate immigration inquiry piggyback the high-volume of lawful 
encounters permitted by the broad power of Terry’s progeny. The practical effect 
of “Show Me Your Papers” provisions is the collection of immigration status infor-
mation to be transmitted to the federal government for compliance with § 1373. 
The practical effect of “Can’t Keep Me From Asking” provisions is not different, in-
jecting uncertainty into encounters with law enforcement. If the officer on the beat 
already believes that it is not part of her duties to inquire into immigration status, 
provisions like this change nothing for her typical encounter. On the other hand, if 
the officer harbors prejudices about undocumented individuals (e.g., believes that 
those unlawfully present in the United States are criminogenic, take resources from 
those lawfully present, or should be deported as soon as possible), such provisions 
arm her to enforce a personal agenda of immigration law, which the local entity can 
no longer prohibit. However, even before these encounters occur, a state that 
passes “Show Me Your Papers” provisions has already co-opted the pervasiveness 
of police power to instill and sustain fear of police’s affiliation with immigration au-
thorities. 
The confluence of Terry and immigration inquiry provisions is made even more 
significant given the way unsuccessful stops stand independent from judicial re-
view. Arrests are subject to probable cause hearings, and discovery of evidence may 
be subject to suppression hearings—the danger of an unlawful arrest or of the “fruit 
of the poisonous tree,” for example, are significant, warranting independent re-
view. But after Terry stops that yield no evidence of criminality, there is no ready 
remedy in criminal procedure for someone who believes that she has been stopped 
based on race. There may be a remedy through a § 1983 claim, but barring the use 
of excessive force, it is highly unlikely that the stopped individual would pursue such 
a claim for one encounter with an officer. As a result, Terry operates as a policing 
mechanism that, when not resulting in arrest, is incredibly difficult to address and 
remedy. 
While states looking to put people in the deportation pipeline have more di-
rect means to do so—287(g) partnerships, arresting immigrants for traffic viola-
tions—states can use the dragnet of Terry alongside “Show Me Your Papers” to 
achieve the same deterrent effect as was accomplished in New York City, simply 
with a different goal and different population in mind. 
B. Using Terry as a Sword to Erase Immigrant Populations 
Given the power of Terry and its ability to target minority populations with a 
mechanism that sits largely outside judicial review, states can piggyback immigra-
tion status inquiries on the lowest level of non-consensual encounters with police, 
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achieving erasure of undocumented immigrants. This section examines the deter-
rent effect of Terry in New York City, as amplified by state policymakers into the aim 
of erasure. Because local officers have such excessive discretion to stop on less than 
probable cause, state policymakers—through passage of legislative campaigns 
aimed at enlisting local officers in immigration enforcement—can therefore use 
stops on less than probable cause to deter those who “look like” undocumented 
immigrants from leaving their homes without fear of being stopped at any time. 
In New York City, these tools were used to accomplish the political goal of 
deterring the public presence of young Black and Hispanic men. Stop-and-frisk was 
explicitly aimed to deter young Black and Hispanic men from leaving their homes 
by imposing the threat they could be stopped at any time.324 Mayor Bloomberg and 
Commissioner Kelley repeatedly underlined through press releases, press confer-
ences, and campaign trail assurances that young men of color were inextricably 
linked to crime.325 This stop-and-frisk policy had its intended effect; young minority 
men knew they could get stopped at any moment.326 An entire generation of young 
people grew up incorporating into their routines “the sense that [they] might find 
[themselves] up against a wall or on the ground with an officer’s gun at [their] 
head[s].”327 Consider the young people stopped on the way to school, coming back 
from football practice, or told to go inside if they sat on a bench outside their build-
ings.328 
Attitudes toward immigration have manifested in even more explicit animus 
than identifiable in the upper echelons of the NYPD. Anti-immigration sentiment is 
hardly new, but there has been a fierce recent resurgence that can be linked to 
President Trump’s campaign rhetoric.329 While on the campaign trail, Trump fanned 
the flames of anti-Latino sentiment, drawing a direct line between unlawful pres-
ence and criminality and capitalizing on resentment of immigrant workers.330 After 
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his inauguration, his Administration has taken a hard line on undocumented immi-
grants, encouraging recipients of the now-rescinded DACA program to prepare for 
their self-deportation.331 
Today, state policymakers encourage local authorities to over-police immi-
grant communities, counting on local police officers to enforce private agendas of 
immigration enforcement by treating immigrants as subordinate and second-class 
status citizens.332 Just as the NYPD counted on police officers to buy into the con-
cept of young men of color being criminogenic, states pushing “Can’t Keep Me from 
Asking” provisions through their legislatures count on officers to harbor a private 
agenda of immigration enforcement. The subtext in these provisions is that officers 
like Officer Andy Lamers—the Minneapolis Metro Transit officer who quizzed Ariel 
Vences-Lopez on his immigration status while checking fares—exist:333 that there 
are officers who would otherwise ask about immigration status but are prohibited 
from doing so by local policy. Through “Show Me Your Papers” or “Can’t Keep Me 
from Asking” provisions, states symbolically bless the efforts of these local officers 
and rely on them to use their wide discretion to stop on less than probable cause 
to amplify political goals of deportation. “This policy of no policy gives officers the 
freedom to act according to their preferences,” writes Amada Armenta, who spent 
more than two years doing field work in Nashville, Tennessee accumulating over 
120 hours of ride-alongs.334 
Just as the NYPD had the intent and effect of instilling fear into young men of 
color that if they left their houses they would be stopped, states passing “Show Me 
Your Papers” provisions do so to erase presence. They do so in hopes of creating an 
environment so hostile to undocumented immigrants that these populations are 
forced to move elsewhere to “self-deport,” in the words of then-Presidential candi-
date Mitt Romney.335 Kris Kobach, co-author of Arizona S.B. 1070 and a key drafter 
of Alabama H.B. 56, described the success of Alabama’s law as having “done a great 
service to America”: “‘There haven’t been mass arrests. There aren’t a bunch of 
court proceedings. People are simply removing themselves. It’s self-deportation at 
no cost to the taxpayer. I’d say that’s a win.’”336 Russell Pearce, another author of 
Arizona S.B. 1070, told the Arizona Republic in 2006—four years before S.B. 1070 
was signed into law—“‘Disneyland taught us that if you shut down the rides people 
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leave the amusement park.’”337 After S.B. 1070 was enacted, Pearce crowed that 
the undocumented were “‘leaving in caravans’”: “‘I’ve talked to a U-Haul dealer . . . 
. He said business has never been better.’”338 
These hostile attitudes are felt deeply by undocumented immigrants and are 
being taken to heart by some who decide it is easier to leave than be deported.339 
“‘They’re sending a message that, “You’re not welcome here, we don’t want you 
here …. We’re going to find you,”’” one immigrant said, explaining why she and her 
family were returning to Mexico.340 When facing her own departure date, another 
immigrant revealed the turmoil: “‘I don’t think about it, because I don’t want to go 
. . . . I don’t know if this is right or not.’”341 
For those who stay, there is deep anxiety as individuals make minute-to-mi-
nute decisions in fear of encounters with police and immigration authorities. Fami-
lies paper over windows and peepholes.342 The physical and mental health of immi-
grant families is negatively affected as parents cancel doctor’s appointments be-
cause of fear of the commute there.343 Immigrant children suffer from depression 
and anxiety, as well as children with problems “eating, sleeping and doing school-
work.”344 One woman who had been taking English classes at a local college stopped 
after Trump was elected and now she stays home, afraid to leave. “‘[W]hen my 
children are at school, I stay in the house. My opinion is it’s more fear.’”345 People 
are afraid to buy groceries or drop their kids at the bus stop.346 For mixed status 
families—e.g., an undocumented parent of a U.S. citizen child—the fear of a par-
ent’s deportation takes on unique proportions as the “separate legal statuses but 
intertwined fates” means a choice between bringing children who may not speak 
the language or dividing the family by leaving them behind.347 Even when paths do 
not cross with ICE, the fear that this could occur is debilitating. “‘It’s like, you’re 
living a happy life . . . . But at the same time, you’re not able to get out of that 
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bubble. You’re just there, trapped.’”348 These are the same harmful outcomes 
pointed to by studies on 287(g) programs: anxiety, tensions, and mistrust of the 
police.349 Those who do not leave avoid public places350 change their driving pat-
terns or change other behavior “to avoid contact with police and other authori-
ties.”351 
States that pass “Show Me Your Papers” or “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” pro-
visions are able to, with every encounter between police and undocumented civil-
ian, add bricks in the wall separating immigrant communities from the outside 
world. Immigrant communities are already gripped with fear as the Administration 
ramps up enforcement at the federal level. Communities stay closely connected 
through technology, informing each other through Facebook, text, and phone of ICE 
movements.352 Immigrants stay out of sight, taking cabs and Ubers instead of driv-
ing, knowing that any interaction with law enforcement can lead to deportation.353 
Provisions that give local officers the state stamp of approval to ask about immigra-
tion status—counting on those with anti-immigrant prejudices—amplify these po-
litical agendas, making life so fraught that the undocumented are not just encour-
aged to leave: they are held captive in their own homes unless they do. 
For the state legislatures passing this legislation, this is the desired effect. The 
consequences for community safety and the economy are significant, spreading the 
impact of the 287(g) programs far and wide without the burdens of official partner-
ships. As learned from studies of 287(g) jurisdictions, when immigrant communities 
associate police presence with immigration enforcement, communities distrust 
their local law enforcement.354 Immigrants avoid reporting crimes—even when they 
are victims—fearing that encounters with police could mean being asked about im-
migration status and being referred to ICE.355 Seasonal workers avoid states with 
these policies, affecting the available worker pool and hurting the state economy.356 
More significantly, the humanitarian effect of the “constant, even urgent source of 
stress” on an entire minority population is significant.357 Even though there are 
more direct methods than Terry of funneling people into the immigration pipeline, 
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for the undocumented immigrant the implication is the same: any encounter with 
local law enforcement is equally rife with fear. 
Ultimately, and perhaps most importantly, the self-deportation approach to 
immigration enforcement reflects a moral and humanitarian void—one that views 
non-citizens as non-persons—paving the way for the denial of human rights.358 This 
attitude manifests itself innocuously as word choice when discussing those present 
unlawfully; consider the words in which supporters and critics of Proposition 187 in 
California characterized the objects of the initiative: “illegal aliens” and “undocu-
mented persons,” respectively.359 This attitude manifests in “us vs. them” language, 
feeding on and propagating narratives of the “Mexican immigrant as the enemy,”360 
the “immigrant welfare problem,”361 and even the “bad hombres” of which presi-
dential candidate Trump warned.362 There is a “bitter irony”363 in characterizing im-
migrants as responsible for a state’s economic and social problems given America’s 
perceived promise as “a nation of immigrants.”364 But marginalizing—even demon-
izing—the “other” is not new in America. Consider the American tragedy of slavery, 
an original sin providing the foundation of an “underclass culture” in urban Amer-
ica,365 the Jim Crow laws, and the sundown towns.366 Consider the largest official 
mass lynching in New Orleans in 1891, not of African-Americans but of eleven Italian 
immigrants acquitted of murder; Teddy Roosevelt “famously said [the lynchings] 
were ‘a rather good thing.’”367 The moral and humanitarian void displayed when 
immigrants are dehumanized—reduced to whether they are legal or not—injures 
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everyone by laying a foundation for, as so painfully carried out in the history of this 
nation, human exploitation and the destruction of communities.368 
V. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO CONFRONTING RACIALIZED ENFORCEMENT 
Advocacy groups who foresee the deep harms of this confluence face signifi-
cant challenges in preventing or remedying them. However, because Terry stops 
that do not lead to arrests sit outside any formal area of review by the courts 
through the Fourth Amendment, advocacy groups must use both litigation and non-
litigation responses, keeping in mind key stakeholders that can be leveraged as well 
as the shortcomings of doing so. State legislative campaigns to enforce immigration 
at the local level would be less effective with less tools in police officers’ toolboxes 
to control the movement of minority community members. However, the Court’s 
current composition and recent trends make limiting the scope of Terry v. Ohio ex-
tremely unlikely. Even less likely is the ability of litigation to remedy harms experi-
enced by undocumented individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated, 
given the inability to suppress identity as the fruit of an unlawful search or sei-
zure.369 This Part will discuss the challenges in litigation responses to the dynamic 
of Terry as a sword, lessons learned from successful efforts to challenge abuses of 
Terry, and the type of policy advocacy that is possible given the critical stakeholders 
that can be engaged. 
A. Obstacles to Litigations Challenging Race-Based Policing 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the product of an unlawful stop or seizure may 
be considered the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”370 However, when pretextual stops 
or Terry stops based on specific articulable facts (such as presence in a “high-crime 
area” paired with avoiding an encounter with the police) lead to immigration con-
sequences, the usual vehicles for challenging race-based enforcement are not avail-
able. Even though policing based on race—and pretextual justification thereof—
runs counter to the heart of the Fourth Amendment, the Court wrote in Whren v. 
United States that the remedy for “object[ions] to intentionally discriminatory ap-
plication of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”371 In 
immigration, a subject’s identity is sufficient to prove commission of an immigration 
violation and cannot be suppressed even as the fruit of a stop unlawful under the 
Fourth Amendment372 and under Utah v. Strieff, identity cannot be suppressed.373 
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Even though these stops may lead to no criminal charges at all, immigration conse-
quences follow when an identity is ascertained. As a result, the Equal Protection 
Clause is the most viable litigation response—but as discussed in this section, it 
faces significant structural challenges. 
There are three key structural challenges to Equal Protection Clause claims 
brought by plaintiffs attempting to show racial profiling, especially in the realm of 
racialized policing towards undocumented immigrants. The first is procedural. Sec-
tion 1983 claims concern constitutional matters by definition and therefore, federal 
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over them; for that reason, airtight class ac-
tion lawsuits must comply strictly with federal pleading standards and the class ac-
tion rules set out in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The second challenge 
is substantive—on the merits. To make a claim of racial profiling under the Equal 
Protection Clause, plaintiffs must be able to show that they were treated differently 
from other similarly situated individuals and if it is due to their race, they must show 
that the government action is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
ment interest.374 The third challenge is strategic; it is often very difficult to find sym-
pathetic ears at the federal district court level, and as shown in Floyd v. City of New 
York, judge-shopping may be necessary to find such a pair of ears.375 
First, plaintiffs face procedural challenges in the form of heightened pleading 
standards and getting classes certified. After the geminate cases Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal altered the pleading standard from notice to “plau-
sibility,” heightened pleading standards negatively affected the disposition of civil 
rights litigation cases.376 In civil rights cases where policy decision makers are so far 
removed from the actual actors that plaintiffs “cannot know or plead essential in-
formation with particularity at the outset [of the case] without the benefit of dis-
covery[,]” denying plaintiffs access to discovery endangers vindication of their con-
stitutional and civil rights.377 If the claimed injury by plaintiffs is being stopped dis-
proportionately more than similarly situated white people, there must be adequate 
and accessible data (discussed infra) to substantiate this claim at the pleading 
stage—before discovery, which would theoretically provide access to documenta-
tion on stops. 
The procedural challenges also extend to class certification. To certify a class 
of plaintiffs, Rule 23 has four requirements: “numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequate representation.”378 While numerosity may not be difficult—requiring 
only a class large enough that “joinder of all members is impracticable”379— com-
monality requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class[,]”380 
and typicality requires that the injuries suffered by class members be typical of the 
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rest of the class.381 In other words, plaintiffs must show that they suffered the same 
kind of injury at the hands of the same system and that those chosen to represent 
the class present typical injuries.382 In Floyd v. City of New York, the class was certi-
fied because the class was large—and ascertainable383—enough based on the avail-
able evidence; the plaintiffs set forth common claims of Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations; and the class representatives’ injuries arose from the 
NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program.384 However, the Judge’s ability to confirm the esti-
mated number of stops—and the amount of constitutionally suspect ones—was 
underlined by the sheer body of data plaintiffs provided.385 
In the immigration enforcement context, if plaintiffs challenging inquiry pro-
visions claim being stopped disproportionately more than similarly situated white 
people because of Latino appearance, the class could theoretically include U.S. cit-
izens, U.S. nationals, and undocumented immigrants. However, without the sheer 
amount of data on stops that was available in Floyd v. City of New York, plaintiffs 
will have trouble corroborating that these stops occurred—and that they may have 
occurred on suspicious constitutional footing. Furthermore, undocumented victims 
of crimes are already deterred from reporting crimes because encounters with the 
legal system may result in deportation.386 These potential class representatives may 
be hesitant to join in a suit because of the media attention and government focus 
they may receive, even if they have experienced the most egregious injuries. 
Second, challenges confront plaintiffs in showing on the merits that racial pro-
filing has occurred in violation of the Equal Protection Clause through a § 1983 
Claim.387 Section 1983 claims are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983;388 to succeed in a § 
1983 claim against a municipality, plaintiffs must show that actions by employees 
that caused constitutional injury were “pursuant to official municipal policy.”389 This 
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policy can be evidenced through actual “policy or custom, whether made by its law-
makers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official pol-
icy.”390 Where the injury is caused by failure to train, the plaintiff must show delib-
erate indifference by “a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained em-
ployees[,]”391 and may show this deliberate indifference through “conscious disre-
gard for the consequences” of failure to prevent tortious conduct.392 In Floyd v. City 
of New York, the District Judge evaluated a significant amount of intent evidence: 
audio recordings of precinct roll calls, statements at meetings regarding data col-
lection, and statements by the high-ranking policymakers in the NYPD.393 This intent 
evidence indicated that the stop-and-frisk program was predominantly racially tar-
geted.394 
In a challenge of race-based policing in immigration enforcement, plaintiffs 
may claim that police officers stop Latino individuals more often than similarly sit-
uated white people. There, the challenge is proving that (1) there is an official or 
unspoken municipal policy thereof, or (2) the officers engaging in these stops were 
improperly trained to an extent indicating deliberate indifference on the part of the 
policymakers. When a state, through legislative campaigns, counts on individual of-
ficers to enforce private immigration agendas, but the municipality itself does not 
have such a policy and its hands are tied by “Can’t Stop Me from Asking” provisions, 
plaintiffs will struggle to show deliberate indifference on the part of the policymak-
ers without evidence of a long-term policy like existed in New York City.395 
The challenge of establishing a claim on its merits also extends to the Equal 
Protection analysis. Generally speaking, a plaintiff may show either that the law or 
policy (1) is facially discriminatory,396 (2) is facially neutral but is applied with a dis-
criminatory animus and results in impact on one race over another,397 or (3) is fa-
cially neutral but is applied in a clear discriminatory pattern that is “unexplainable 
on grounds other than race.”398 In Floyd, as discussed, the discriminatory animus 
was easily determined by the large amount of intent evidence.399 A clear discrimi-
natory pattern was also discernable, as the plaintiffs’ case was built upon the sta-
tistical analysis of the data available on stops.400 The district court concluded that 
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the practice of race-based and otherwise unjustified stops was persistent and wide-
spread, as corroborated by the stop data.401 
If the plaintiffs’ claim is that police officers stop Latino individuals more often 
than similarly situated white people, the obstacle is being able to present evidence 
enough to prove that the policy is facially discriminatory (e.g., policy of encouraging 
these types of stops based on race), or that it has significant impact on one race 
over another and is accompanied by animus, or it is applied with a clear pattern 
that cannot be otherwise explained. Dismissing for a moment the difficulty of es-
tablishing that a policy in fact existed, a significant challenge confronts plaintiffs in 
gathering evidence to prove animus or discriminatory intent; the Court itself recog-
nized this as a “sensitive inquiry” where evidence may not be available,402 but did 
not pave the way for plaintiffs. 
Finally, the strategic challenge of finding a sympathetic—but not overtly bi-
ased—forum remains, as highlighted by a wrench in the works criticized after Floyd 
v. City of New York. In New York City, Floyd was not the first high-profile lawsuit 
addressing NYPD’s “stop-and-frisk” policy, but arose after settlement of Daniels v. 
City of New York in 2001, a case presided over by Judge Shira Scheindlin in the 
Southern District of New York.403 Since arriving on the federal bench career, Judge 
Scheindlin had arguably evidenced bias against police; she had given interviews ex-
hibiting a slant against police officers, and, according to a study by the New York 
City Mayor’s office, her track record suppressed “evidence on the basis of illegal 
police searches far more than any of her colleagues—twice as often as the second-
place judge.”404 
Six years after Daniels, the parties returned to her courtroom, the plaintiffs 
accusing the NYPD of a resurgence of the stops that precipitated the Daniels case 
and settlement.405 Judge Scheindlin declined to re-open the case but suggested that 
there might be a “good constitutional case[]” there, indicating that it might be 
marked as “related.”406 Because of the “related cases” rule in the District—which 
allowed judges to claim priority for newly filed cases related to those already as-
signed to them, Judge Scheindlin was assigned the subsequently filed Floyd v. City 
of New York.407 The judge was criticized for the appearance of bias against police, 
and although Floyd was handed to the plaintiffs at the district court level—and the 
City subsequently decided to settle it after newly elected Mayor Bill de Blasio en-
tered office408—these criticisms led to the Judge’s removal from the cases deemed 
“related” to Daniels.409 Practically speaking, plaintiffs looking to bring a suit in the 
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Southern District of New York now faced the difficulty of finding a court as hospita-
ble as Judge Scheindlin’s. Likewise, while the “related cases” rule is not unique to 
the Southern District of New York, potential class action plaintiffs have an uphill 
road in finding a forum where their claims will be heard without appearance of bias 
on either side. 
These challenges—the requirement for the “right plaintiffs,” the right kind of 
municipal policy, sufficient evidence to survive the pleading stage, as well as time 
to establish data on police encounters—pose an incredible uphill battle. At present, 
the majority of challenges to state legislative provisions are facial, not as-applied, 
so for cases to be as successful as Floyd without the suspicious “related cases” rule 
and an overly sympathetic judge, there must be significant amounts of data on po-
lice encounters from which an unbiased judge may infer racial motivation and im-
pact. 
B. The Role and Struggle of Data Collection: Keeping Authorities Accountable 
Where a state action concerning immigration enforcement does not explicitly 
classify based on race and is not easily vulnerable to an Equal Protection challenge 
based on a codified racialized enforcement policy, the best route is establishing by 
evidence a clear discriminatory pattern that is “unexplainable on grounds other 
than race.”410 To show racial profiling through statistics, plaintiffs must show “that 
the disparity cannot be explained by some other nondiscriminatory factor or chance 
variations in selecting whom to stop.”411 They must have data of such volume and 
specificity by which experts can show this disparity. A successful racial profiling 
case, therefore, requires standing on the shoulders of giants before who fought for 
comprehensive, meaningful, and transparent data collection. There are significant 
hurdles to clear before plaintiffs can utilize a sound body of data in such a case, 
culminating in the need for comprehensive tracking at all levels of enforcement. 
Data collection for racial profiling analysis requires collecting information “on 
the nature, character, and demographics of police enforcement practices.”412 This 
includes an officer’s decision to stop as well as how the officer acts during that stop; 
for example, whether subjects were searched, consent was requested, and how 
long the encounter lasted.413 Data collection is often required as part of racial pro-
filing settlements to allow for further monitoring, as occurred in NYPD after Daniels 
v. City of New York.414 If Daniels had not included this requirement for officers to 
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document their reasons for stop and frisks, Floyd would never have been as suc-
cessful as it was.415 Some jurisdictions have begun to collect data on stops preemp-
tively in hopes of exonerating themselves before complaints arise.416 Still, other ju-
risdictions, like the state of Kansas, require tracking only of racial profiling com-
plaints.417 
However, challenges exist for both data collection and analysis. One signifi-
cant challenge comes when jurisdictions decide to track and analyze data internally. 
When handled internally, setting up an effective data collection system can be an 
arduous, complicated process, as California has discovered.418 Some jurisdictions 
preemptively track stop data but miss important variables such as factors leading 
to reasonable suspicion or cause to stop a vehicle.419 Others track over a short pe-
riod of time, using this data to conclude there is no evidence of racial profiling.420 
Still, other jurisdictions track data internally but do not share it, or share it only after 
significant redaction.421 Conversely, when data is tracked by external entities, police 
departments may face allegations of underreporting stops, and in turn, may dis-
count this data and its methodology as “deeply flawed.”422 
Furthermore, even if a sufficiently representative body of data is acquired, a 
major hurdle is deciding on an interpretation that properly accounts for all relevant 
factors, including policing priorities and the rate of successful stops.423 What consti-
tutes a “sound methodology” for data analysis and how to control for population 
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samples varies widely between scholars and analysts.424 These challenges coalesce 
in the trend of “polar opposite answers” based on the same body of data.425 
Advocacy groups predicting an uptick of racialized enforcement must now 
more than ever call for comprehensive data collection at every level of law enforce-
ment. Data collection still provides the best way to empirically establish the pres-
ence of improper, discriminatory motive in racialized enforcement.426 The scatter-
shot of methodologies emphasizes the need for a unified approach, but the first 
step is establishing a foundation—a control against which data can be compared 
when immigration enforcement provisions are passed and go into effect. This ad-
vocacy work should be focused at every level—local, county, and state enforcement 
entities—and should include both traffic stops and pedestrian stops so as to accu-
rately reflect the broad discretion given to officers to initiate non-consensual en-
counters with civilians.427 
What made the data in Floyd v. City of New York so unique was the access to 
the very database that police entered the data into, and the statistical analysis avail-
able from the two most used justifications for stops.428 When filling out UF-250s, 
officers could select any number of factors, including, inter alia, “furtive move-
ments” “casing” “evasive actions,” and “suspicious bulge.”429 These observable sus-
pect behaviors were specific enough for officers to justify in individual cases, but 
subjective enough to serve as a basis for conclusion that many of the “furtive move-
ments” stops were based on the bare minimum of stop justification.430 Further-
more, because the data was required as part of the Daniels settlement, there were 
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certain categories of information that were mandatory for tracking—and the data 
was turned over regularly to counsel for plaintiffs.431 
Furthermore, because of the wide variation in the jurisdictional application of 
data collection, advocacy groups in states seeking to pass immigration enforcement 
legislation should look nationally for methodology and standards. One suggestion 
is to coordinate with national initiatives such as the National Initiative for Building 
Community Trust and Justice, established in 2014 through a Department of Justice 
grant, to determine local need and methods to shore up procedural justice.432 Al-
ternatively, groups may lobby for and craft data collection rules that meet the 
NAACP criteria for effective anti-racial profiling bills.433 
The challenges to effective data collection provides long odds for immigrant 
advocacy groups anticipating racialized enforcement targeting Latinos. With the hu-
manitarian cost of anxiety and fear among immigrant communities, advocacy 
groups simply do not have the time required to collect evidence and prove discrim-
inatory animus and impact. At a time when ICE boasts a 37% increase in interior 
removals in FY 2017 as compared to 2016,434 every day that immigration enforce-
ment provisions are on the books and carried out in practice is a day of fear and 
disruption for immigrant communities. Therefore, the best short-term solution is 
preventing these provisions from being enacted in the first place, namely through 
engaging immigrant employers in policy change. 
C. Engaging Immigrant Employers in Policy Change 
For the short-term, the most effective solution to avoid the state-endorsed 
dangers of unleashing police officers with personal immigration enforcement agen-
das is to engage employers of immigrants in the policymaking process. Because the 
immediate consequence of deterring immigrant presence is deterring employment 
of immigrants, leaders of industries that employ immigrants have skin in the game, 
so to speak, by losing potential employees. This approach to policy decisions—if 
long-term—flies in the face of moral and humanitarian concerns about treating im-
migrants as just cogs in the production system. However, it is effective. This section 
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reviews the impact of engaging immigrant employers to stop state legislation aimed 
to drive out undocumented immigrants. 
The writing on the wall is clear: heavily agricultural states suffer when anti-
immigrant legislation is pushed through. By the time H.B. 87 was passed in Georgia 
in 2011, containing many copycat provisions to Arizona’s S.B. 1070,435 it had faced 
significant opposition from the agricultural industry.436 As predicted, by deterring 
immigrant presence in the state, the state itself was running off workers the fruit 
and vegetable industry needed to harvest crops that otherwise would, and did, rot 
in the fields.437 With the agricultural workforce (authorized or unauthorized alike) 
shrinking since 2002,438 any risk of worker loss is felt deeply by the industry. In 2011, 
a University of Georgia study found, about 11,000 jobs went unfilled in Georgia.439 
This deterrence of presence also did not result in “self-deportation” from the coun-
try; workers instead found agricultural jobs in less hostile states like North Caro-
lina.440 Likewise, Texas S.B. 4’s impact on the agricultural industry has been ampli-
fied by increased ICE presence and the omnipresence of interior checkpoints and 
has resulted in agricultural losses in areas further into the interior.441 
Reading the writing on the wall, many states have considered these costs 
when preventing the passage of S.B. 1070 copycats, such as in Kentucky and Idaho. 
In Idaho, H.B. 76/198 was introduced, a near-carbon copy of S.B. 4 containing the 
same “Can’t Keep Me from Asking” and anti-sanctuary policy provisions.442 How-
ever, the Idaho Dairymen’s Association, Food Producers of Idaho, and the Idaho 
Association of Commerce and Industry worked to lobby against the bill, citing the 
bill’s effect on available workers.443 “[W]ithout workers, without somebody that’s 
going to be there 12 hours a day, milking your cows, getting dirty, there’s no busi-
ness[.]”444 The Dairymen’s Association Executive Director publicly announced, “We 
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would never be supportive of the bill, and we’re reassessing whether we can remain 
neutral . . . .”445 As a result, the agriculture and dairy industry’s lack of support of 
S.B. 98/176 was instrumental in the bill dying in committee.446 In Kentucky, for ex-
ample, S.B. 6 was introduced in 2011 but died in committee after significant con-
cerns about the associated costs—not the least of which was the loss of economic 
activity due to losing more than 12,000 jobs.447 
Advocacy groups seeking to avoid the injury of state immigration enforcement 
on immigrant communities must address the short-term damage by lobbying with 
industry leaders, especially those in agriculture where immigrant presence (or lack 
thereof) immediately affects the bottom line, but must be aware of the long-term 
damage of relying on these industries to do the policy heavy lifting. Employers can 
pay immigrants lower wages to do jobs that Americans do not seek.448 Reliance on 
industries to spearhead policy reform equates immigrants with their utility to the 
industry—equating deservingness of dignity with productivity. With that in mind, 
advocacy groups must work both in the short- and long-term to protect immigrant 
communities while preserving their dignity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At the fiftieth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio, the full weight of Terry cannot be 
underestimated. Terry lowered the standard required for non-consensual encoun-
ters with law enforcement and has been used effectively to deter the presence of 
targeted individuals, as shown by the NYPD’s massive stop-and-frisk program. At a 
time when state legislatures are testing the confines of federalism, the continued 
success of “Show Me Your Papers” and “Can’t Stop Me from Asking” provisions after 
Arizona provide a blueprint for states to structure immigration enforcement statu-
tory schemes. 
Because “reasonable suspicion” stops can be used to deter presence when 
paired with political agendas, states today can rely on the deterrent effect of exces-
sive police discretion in initiating non-consensual encounters. Arizona meant that 
immigration status could be investigated at the lowest level encounter with local 
law enforcement. After Terry, the lowest level encounter for a lawful stop by local 
law enforcement required only a very small amount of suspicion of criminality. 
Thus, states build upon Terry’s vast discretion (and ill-defined limits) to achieve the 
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political goal of self-deportation, just as the NYPD relied on the deterrent effect of 
Terry to decrease the presence of young men of color. Given the grave impact on 
immigrant communities, advocacy groups must come armed in mounting a re-
sponse to these initiatives. 
Because both “Show Me Your Papers” and “Can’t Stop Me from Asking” are 
equally likely to survive facial Constitutional challenges based on recent trends and 
the confines of federalism laid out in Arizona v. United States, the challenge for ad-
vocacy groups is to lay a framework by which the anticipated racialized enforce-
ment can be measured and litigated. This long-term mechanism of data collection, 
however, is best coupled with short-term engagement by industries that employ 
large immigrant numbers. 
Ultimately, the Administration dictates ICE priorities and charts the course for 
immigration enforcement. However, state initiatives to encourage “self-deporta-
tion” further widen racial rifts between community and authorities when they give 
carte blanche to immigration enforcement-minded officers. Advocacy groups and 
the public alike must be aware of the effect of the policing tools that states co-opt 
to achieve attrition through enforcement. States that enact anti-immigrant legisla-
tion will in time discover the grave consequences of immigrant erasure and will 
have inflicted countless injuries to Latino communities in the process. Until these 
consequences are widely felt, however, advocates must call attention to the efforts 
of states to use Terry as a sword to encourage self-deportation—relying on a high 
volume of lawful non-consensual encounters to erode trust among immigrant com-
munities—to erase entire communities from the nation of immigrants. 
 
